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I
INTRODUCTION
Quantifying noneconomic loss is a profound, longstanding, and seemingly
intractable problem in the civil justice system.1 For the most part, courts and
legal scholars have thrown their hands up and surrendered to the view that the
magnitude of human suffering is essentially unknowable in any objective sense.
The problem has been left to juries, “in the apparent hope that jurors can fill
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1. Parts of this article (excluding the empirical analysis) are adapted from a report produced by
the authors for a legislative task force in the State of Washington in 2005. That report is available as
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the intellectual void.”2 Courts provide little guidance and give juries wide
deference on how to arrive at noneconomic-damages figures.3
Jurors struggle with the assignment. Survey data suggests that juries often
view the determination of damages—particularly the noneconomic
component—as more difficult than the decision about liability.4 In one
simulation exercise conducted with a large sample of veniremen outside a North
Carolina courtroom, the participants
uniformly commented on the difficulty of putting a price on pain and suffering and
used different methods of calculating the awards. Some roughly split the difference
between the defendant’s and the plaintiff’s suggested figures. One juror doubled what
the defendant said was fair, and another said it should be three times medical
expenses. One juror said, “[Eight] months of pain and suffering missing out of her
teen years. She should receive no more than what most people make in a year”
(awarded $50,000). A number of jurors assessed pain and suffering on a per month
basis, such as $4000 or $5000 and multiplied by the eight months that the plaintiff was
incapacitated. Other jurors indicated that they just came up with a figure that they
5
thought was fair.

Unsurprisingly, jury valuations of noneconomic loss vary widely.6 The same
appears to be true of these valuations outside court, although decisions by
“repeat players,” such as arbiters and insurance adjusters, appear to have
slightly less inconsistency.7 Previous empirical research has found that
noneconomic-damages determinations adhere reasonably well to the principle
of “vertical equity” (that is, damages tend to climb with injury severity), but do
poorly in achieving “horizontal equity” (injuries of similar severity receiving
similar compensation).8 For example, a 2004 study of California malpractice

2. W. KIP VISCUSI, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 101 (1991).
3. Edith Greene & Brian H. Bornstein, Precious Little Guidance: Jury Instructions on Damages
Awards, 6 PSYCH. PUB. POL. & L. 743, 744–46 (2000); Mark A. Geistfeld, Due Process and the
Determination of Pain and Suffering Tort Damages, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 331, 341–42 (2006); Roselle L.
Wissler et al., Instructing Jurors on General Damages in Personal Injury Cases: Problems and
Possibilities, 6 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 712, 714–18 (2000).
4. Shari S. Diamond, What Jurors Think: Expectations and Reactions of Citizens Who Serve as
Jurors, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL JURY SYSTEM 282, 297 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993).
5. Neil J. Vidmar, Empirical Evidence on the “Deep Pockets” Hypothesis: Jury Awards for Pain
and Suffering in Medical Malpractice Cases, 43 DUKE L.J. 217, 253–54 (1993) (footnote omitted).
6. See Richard Abel, General Damages Are Incoherent, Incalculable, Incommensurable, and
Inegalitarian (But Otherwise a Great Idea), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 253, 291–304 (2006) (describing
variation of general-damages amounts in specific contexts and reviewing a wide range of calculability
problems); James F. Blumstein, Making the System Work Better: Improving the Process for
Determination of Noneconomic Loss, 35 N.M. L. REV. 401, 405, 410 (2005) (citing evidence that
noneconomic components of damages awards are the most variable).
7. Neil Vidmar & Jeffrey R. Rice, Instructing Jurors on General Damages in Personal Injury
Cases: Problems and Possibilities, 6 PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 712, 892–96 (1993) (examining variability
in award determinations made by twenty-one experienced arbitrators and forty-seven veniremen in
response to standardized cases in an experimental study); Joseph Sanders, Reforming General
Damages: A Good Tort Reform, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 115, 123–28 (2008) (reviewing
empirical research on variability in noneconomic-damages determinations).
8. David M. Studdert et al., Are Damages Caps Regressive? A Study of Malpractice Jury Verdicts
in California, 23 HEALTH AFF. 54, 58–59 (2004) (analyzing noneconomic-damages awards in a sample
of California medical-malpractice cases from 1985 to 2002); Randall R. Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life
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verdicts found that injuries ranked by physicians on a nine-point scale according
to their level of severity received noneconomic damages awards that varied up
to twelvefold within rankings.9
What explains this variability? Consistent determinations in this area may
simply lie beyond the capacity of groups of laypersons without guidance or
some means of calibration.10 It is also likely that ostensibly extraneous factors
enter the calculation, such as the plaintiff’s gender, race, socioeconomic status,
or physical appearance, as well as perceptions of the defendant’s culpability.11
These and other attributes of plaintiffs almost certainly stir varying levels of
empathy among jurors, and some juries will have greater collective empathy
than others.12 Heuristics, such as anchoring effects created by attorneys’
arguments as to what constitutes an appropriate award, are another likely
driver of inconsistency.13 Whatever the explanations, the heterogeneity in
noneconomic-damages awards among injuries of similar severity is inefficient,
inequitable, and has damaging consequences for the legitimacy of personalinjury compensation systems.
This article proceeds in six parts. Part II explains why making compensation
of noneconomic damages in personal-injury litigation more rational and
predictable is socially valuable. Part III critiques damages caps, the standard
policy intervention used to control noneconomic damages in American tort law.
Part IV discusses noneconomic-damages schedules as an alternative to caps,
reviews several potential approaches to construction of schedules, and argues
and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering”, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 908, 920–25 (1989) (studying
total damages awards in 1973 through 1987 in a sample consisting of medical malpractice cases, product
liability cases, auto injury cases, and cases against government defendants); Roselle Wissler et al.,
Decisionmaking About General Damages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L.
REV. 751, 808–10 (1999) (finding reasonable vertical equity in a sample of awards by mock jurors, but a
substantial degree of horizontal inequity).
9. Studdert et al., supra note 8, at 59.
10. Some research suggests that less than half of the variation in noneconomic damages can be
explained by “true” variation in the nature or extent of the injuries in question. Bovbjerg et al., supra
note 8, at 923. See also generally MICHAEL G. SHANLEY & MARK A. PETERSON, COMPARATIVE
JUSTICE: CIVIL JURY VERDICTS IN SAN FRANCISCO AND COOK COUNTIES, 1959–1980 (1983). The
chief problem with such estimates, however, is the benchmark against which such variation is measured
is illusory. The level of physical injury tends to be used as a proxy for severity of noneconomic harm,
but it is a flawed proxy. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
11. For illustrative empirical studies of the role of these factors in jury decisions, see the sources
cited in Frederick S. Levin, Pain and Suffering Guidelines: A Cure for Damages Measurement
“Anomie”, 22 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 303, 321 (1989). The role of extraneous factors in assessments of
noneconomic damages warrants special attention given evidence that the influence of such factors on
jury decisionmaking tends to increase with the vagueness of legal standards. See Martin Kaplan & L.E.
Miller, A Model of Cognitive Processes in Jurors, 10 REPRESENTATIVE RES. SOC. PSYCHOL. 48, 49
(1979), cited in Levin, supra, at 321 n.68.
12. See generally Jody Lynee Madeira, Lashing Reason to the Mast: Understanding Judicial
Constraints on Emotion in Personal Injury Litigation, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 137 (analyzing “empathic
identification” and the role it may play in jurors’ determinations of damages for pain and suffering).
13. Wissler et al., supra note 3, at 723–24 (reviewing studies on the anchoring effect). See generally
Edward J. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81
VA. L. REV. 1341 (1995) (analyzing “framing effects” in jury decisions about noneconomic damages).
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for use of a health-utilities approach as the most promising model. Part V
presents an empirical analysis. The analysis combines health-utilities data
created in a previous study with original empirical work to demonstrate how
key steps in construction of a health-utilities-based schedule for noneconomic
damages might proceed. Part VI briefly discusses implementation challenges for
such a schedule.
Much of the article focuses on jury decisionmaking in medical-malpractice
litigation. Some of the data used in the empirical analyses comes from this
setting, and juries are a natural starting point because determinations about
noneconomic damages are most visible and explicit in this node of the tort
system. However, the approach this article outlines for guiding the calculation
of noneconomic damages need not be so confined. It has potential applicability
to all forms of personal-injury compensation in which noneconomic losses are
valued, and to alternative dispute resolution forums, administrative
compensation schemes, and settlement negotiations. Indeed, if a health-utilitiesbased schedule were adopted, its impact is likely to be largest outside courts,
where the vast majority of determinations about damages occur and
quantification of noneconomic loss is also deeply fraught, even for seasoned
decisionmakers.14
II
WHY NONECONOMIC DAMAGES MATTER15
A. Implications for Insurance
The adverse effects of erratic compensation payments are felt throughout
the civil justice system. They infect compensation systems with unpredictability
and instability; increase the costs of liability insurance; undermine deterrence;
allow case-to-case inequities to flourish; and weaken the legitimacy of the tort
liability system in the eyes of the media, the public, and policymakers.16
When damages awards are highly variable and insurers cannot predict them
with reasonable precision, the cost of insurance rises.17 Every malpracticeinsurance premium dollar includes an amount that represents the insurer’s
uncertainty about its exposure. The greater the uncertainty, the larger that
amount will be. Where uncertainty is extreme and the potential exposure

14. At 5%–10%, medical-malpractice cases have one of the highest trial rates among tort cases; for
other leading claim categories, trials occur in 1%–3% of cases. CAROL J. DEFRANCES ET AL., U.S.
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE SURVEY OF STATE COURTS, 1992: CIVIL JURY CASES AND
VERDICTS IN LARGE COUNTIES 2 (1995). See also generally Vidmar & Rice, supra note 7, and Sanders,
supra note 7 (both discussing imprecision of decisionmakers other than jurors).
15. This part has been adapted from the TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 26–29.
16. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 8, at 908.
17. Patricia M. Danzon, Medical Malpractice Liability, in LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY
101, 122 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988); James F. Blumstein, supra note 6, at 401.
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massive, some insurers may choose to withdraw from the market entirely.18
Others will engage in underwriting practices that make liability insurance
unaffordable or unavailable to some healthcare providers.
In medical malpractice, as in many other areas of personal-injury law,
insurers have trouble predicting the noneconomic component of damages
awards. Although the economic component of awards is often large,
particularly for severe injuries to infants and young children, the methodologies
for its calculation are relatively clear and well established. This allows both
sides in a dispute to converge on proximate estimates of economic loss.19 But
there is no agreed-upon methodology for estimating noneconomic losses,
leaving this component of damages awards highly unpredictable. Because jury
awards for pain-and-suffering damages can run to millions of dollars, this
unpredictability can have damaging consequences for liability insurers and
uninsured or underinsured healthcare providers.
B. Implications for Deterrence
Variability and unpredictability in damages awards also blur any deterrent
signal that the tort system might emit. Deterrence hinges on potential
tortfeasors’ ability to gauge what the economic sanctions associated with
careless behavior would be. Rational cost–benefit calculations around different
levels of precaution-taking cannot be performed with accuracy where the costs
are not known with reasonable certainty.
The result may be too much precaution-taking (over-deterrence) or too
little (under-deterrence).20 In the medical-malpractice context, over-deterrence
manifests as “defensive medicine”—the ordering of medical tests, procedures,
or visits or the avoidance of high-risk patients or procedures, primarily (but not
necessarily solely) to reduce providers’ exposure to malpractice liability.21
Defensive medicine leads to higher healthcare costs and may even involve
physical harm to patients, since no medical procedure is risk free.22 On the other
hand, under-deterrence may also occur, meaning that healthcare providers take
less than the socially appropriate degree of care and invest less than the optimal
level of resources in improving patient safety and preventing medical injuries.
This has obvious consequences in terms of patient harm, and flow-on financial
effects because the social costs of medical injury extend beyond the patient’s

18. Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 788; Bovbjerg et al., supra note 8, at 925.
19. There is an exception whenever uncertainty around the plaintiff’s life expectancy opens up
room for dispute over the period of time over which economic losses will be sustained.
20. Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 786.
21. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, DEFENSIVE MEDICINE AND MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE 21 (1994).
22. David M. Studdert et al., Defensive Medicine Among High-Risk Specialist Physicians in a
Volatile Malpractice Environment, 293 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 2609, 2616 (2005).
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suffering to include negative externalities such as medical costs to society and
lost productive capacity.23
C. Implications for Fairness
In addition to being costly and inefficient, the present laissez-faire approach
to determining noneconomic damages results in inequitable treatment of
plaintiffs. The well-documented problems with horizontal equity subvert the
basic notion that a just system treats similarly situated persons in a similar way.24
D. Implications for Public Trust and Confidence
Concerns among the public and legislators about “jackpot” awards in a civil
justice system that is “out of control” are often articulated as ambit critiques;
but when they narrow, noneconomic damages are typically singled out as a
major culprit.25 Several factors feed this perception: media publicity about cases
in which plaintiffs have recovered huge pain-and-suffering awards for seemingly
trivial injuries, the variability in jury awards observed for ostensibly similar
cases, the controversial nature of noneconomic loss, and the political
unpopularity of suggesting that injured patients should not be fully
compensated for their economic losses. The absence of a coherent framework
for assessing noneconomic losses leaves them vulnerable to charges of
unreasonableness that have far-reaching consequences for public perceptions of
the tort system.26 Bovbjerg and colleagues posit that, “At root, one’s attitude
about the liability system generally, and damage awards specifically, seems to
depend a great deal on one’s attitude concerning non-economic damages . . . .”27
How well does the perception that noneconomic damages are a major
culprit in large awards match the empirical reality? It is surprisingly difficult to

23. Michelle M. Mello et al., Who Pays for Medical Errors? An Analysis of Adverse Event Costs,
the Medical Liability System, and Incentives for Patient Safety Improvement, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL
STUD. 835, 847–52 (2007); Eric J. Thomas et al., Costs of Medical Injuries in Colorado and Utah in 1992,
36 INQUIRY 255, 259–61 (1999).
24. For a discussion of these equity problems, see Bovbjerg et al., supra note 8, at 924; Abel, supra
note 6, at 303–15; and Sanders, supra note 7, at 123–28.
25. See generally Carly N. Kelly & Michelle M. Mello, Are Medical Malpractice Damages Caps
Constitutional? An Overview of State Litigation, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 515 (2005) (documenting a
widespread perception that large awards for noneconomic damages are a key driver of malpracticeinsurance premiums for physicians). An excellent illustration of the direct line drawn between
noneconomic damages, “excessive payouts,” and other evils of the tort system was the Bush
Administration’s long-running campaign for noneconomic-damages caps:
Anybody who goes into court and wins their case ought to get full economic damages. At the
same time, we must prevent excessive awards that drive up costs, encourage frivolous lawsuits,
and promote drawn-out legal proceedings. And that is why we need a reasonable federal limit
on non-economic damages awarded in medical liability lawsuits, and the reasonable limit in
my judgment ought to be $250,000.
George W. Bush, Speech at High Point University in Greensboro, NC (July 25, 2002), available at
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020725-1.html.
26. Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 781.
27. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 8, at 919.
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answer that question. Available evidence suggests that noneconomic damages
account for a significant proportion of awards—approximately 30%–40%
across all awards, and 40%–70% of large verdicts in medical-malpractice and
other types of personal-injury litigation.28 However, these statistics come mainly
from payments resulting from jury verdicts. The vast majority of claims that
attract payment never reach court verdicts and the split for them is unknown;
they are not publicly reported. Moreover, the parties to a settlement themselves
are usually unaware, in any explicit sense, of precisely what proportion of the
agreed-upon amount covers noneconomic loss.29 Nevertheless, the belief that
noneconomic damages play an important role in driving up total payouts has
focused the interest of tort reformers on the noneconomic component of
awards.
III
DAMAGES CAPS AND THEIR SHORTCOMINGS30
A. The Darling of Tort Reform
Malpractice “crises” in the mid-1970s, mid-1980s, and early 2000s provided
fertile ground for negative perceptions of noneconomic damages to flourish and
created enduring interest among legislators in limiting them. Indeed, for the last
four decades, caps on noneconomic damages have been the centerpiece of tortreform packages aimed at reducing the cost of malpractice litigation. About half
the states currently impose them.31 A review of these laws is helpful for
understanding the theoretical and practical reasons to pursue damages
schedules as an alternative to caps.
B. Anatomy of Caps
The prototypical form of the noneconomic-damages cap is California’s,
adopted in 1975 as part of the Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act
(MICRA).32 The MICRA cap is a flat limit of $250,000 that is not adjusted for

28. W. Kip Viscusi, Pain and Suffering in Product Liability Cases: Systematic Compensation or
Capricious Awards?, 8 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 203, 207 (1988) (analysis of product liability cases);
Bovbjerg et al., supra note 8, at 922, 937 (authors’ recalculations of data from Table 2 and Table 3);
Neil Vidmar, The Performance of the American Civil Jury: An Empirical Perspective, 40 ARIZ. L. REV.
849, 883 (1998); Michelle M. Mello et al., National Costs of the Medical Liability System, 29 HEALTH
AFF. 1569, 1571 (2010).
29. Mello et al., supra note 28, at 1571.
30. This part has been adapted from the TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 30–34.
31. MICHELLE M. MELLO & ALLEN KACHALIA, EVALUATION OF OPTIONS FOR MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE SYSTEM REFORM 3 (2010), available at http://www.medpac.gov/documents/
Apr10_MedicalMalpractice_CONTRACTOR.pdf (reporting that twenty-six states cap noneconomic
damages). Since the publication of this report, the caps in Illinois and Georgia have been struck down
by the supreme courts in each state. See Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp., 930 N.E. 2d 895 (Ill. 2010);
Atlanta Oculoplastic Surgery v. Nestlehutt, 691 S.E.2d 218 (Ga. 2010).
32. Ch. 1, § 24.6, 1975 Cal. Stat. 3969 (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.2 (West 2010)).
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inflation. Other states adopting caps have generally looked to MICRA as a
model; however, states have varied their approaches to caps legislation in at
least six respects.
First, the absolute baseline amount of the cap varies. A few states have
adopted California’s $250,000 cutoff; more common are amounts between
$250,000 and $500,000, and some states have ceilings above the $500,000 level.
Second, some states allow an inflation adjustment and others do not. This can
make a significant difference over the medium- to long-term: California’s
$250,000 cap, for example, would have approached $986,000 in 2009 if it had
been adjusted annually by the Consumer Price Index.33
Third, three states (Massachusetts, Florida, and Ohio) allow the judge or
jury in a particular case to waive the cap if they feel the circumstances of the
case warrant it. Fourth, some states restrict the cap to certain kinds of injuries—
for example, the caps in Oregon and Maine apply only to wrongful death cases.
Fifth, one state, Alaska, has calibrated the amount of the cap to the plaintiff’s
life expectancy. Alaska specifies a dollar amount that is to be multiplied by the
plaintiff’s estimated remaining years of life.34
Finally, several states employ a tiered rather than flat cap. That is, the
legislation specifies two or three different dollar ceilings that apply to injuries of
different levels of severity. For example, Maryland’s cap is $812,500 for death
cases and $650,000 for all other cases,35 and Ohio’s $350,000 ceiling is raised to
$500,000 in cases of permanent physical or functional impairment.36
C. Lessons Learned
States’ approaches to and experiences with noneconomic caps provide three
key lessons. First, the selection of a dollar value for the cap should, in theory,
represent a societal judgment about what constitutes reasonable but not
excessive compensation for noneconomic loss. That judgment is made at a
particular point in time; however, the value of dollars decreases over time. If
the social-valuation judgment is to have any enduring meaning, the cap should
at least be adjusted annually for inflation in order to maintain its real value.37
Second, caps have not provided any substantive guidance to juries about
appropriate awards. Indeed, juries are theoretically blinded to the existence of a
cap; they certainly are not instructed as to its existence.38 Caps can help

33. To perform this calculation, see, for example, THE INFLATION CALCULATOR, http://www.
westegg.com/inflation/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2011).
34. ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.010 (LexisNexis 2011).
35. Maryland Patients’ Access to Quality Health Care Act of 2004, Ch. 5, 2004 Md. Laws Spec.
Sess. 28 (codified at MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-2A-09 (LexisNexis 2011)).
36. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2323.43 (LexisNexis 2011).
37. Cf. Danzon, supra note 17, at 123 (“The schedule should be indexed to the relevant measures
(medical costs, wages) to prevent either erosion or inflation of standards of compensation relative to
real incomes.”).
38. Studdert et al., supra note 8, at 56.
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counteract very large noneconomic-damages awards, but they do nothing to
address the problem of damages awards beneath the cap level that might
nonetheless be considered excessive given the nature of the injury. Nor do they
deal with the problem of inappropriately low awards, since they set no floors.
The result is that “any awards below the cap are subject to the same claims of
arbitrariness and unfairness that plague the current system.”39
Third, consumer and attorney groups, as well as some scholarly
commentators, charge that damages caps are fundamentally unfair. Caps
inadequately compensate the most severely injured patients40 while failing to
address the undercompensation and overcompensation of pain and suffering in
the range of losses that fall below the cap.41 Further, critics claim that the burden
of caps falls disproportionately heavily on the shoulders of low-wage earners,
particularly women and the elderly, who rely on the noneconomic portion of
damages awards to obtain compensation.42
Two empirical studies have investigated these claims using data on
California jury verdicts that were subject to the MICRA cap.43 Both found
strong evidence that the impact of caps was distributed inequitably across
different types of injuries. In terms of the absolute size of the reductions in
awards, the burden climbs monotonically with severity of injury, except for
deaths. This is troubling because other research suggests that plaintiffs with
severe injuries are already at highest risk for inadequate compensation.44 This
constitutes a kind of “double jeopardy” for the severely injured.45 On the other
hand, the studies generally found no statistically significant differences in the

39. Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 790.
40. See, e.g., W. Washington, Lawyers Back Candidates, Lobbyists to Prevent Malpractice Award
Cap, BOS. GLOBE, July 19, 2003, at A3; AM. LAW INST., REPORTERS’ STUDY: ENTERPRISE LIABILITY
FOR PERSONAL INJURY 217–30 (1991); Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 776; VISCUSI, supra note 2, at 107.
41. Ronen Avraham, Putting a Price on Pain-and-Suffering Damages: A Critique of the Current
Approaches and a Preliminary Proposal for Change, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 87, 99 (2006); Maxwell J.
Mehlman, Promoting Fairness in the Medical Malpractice System, in MEDICAL MALPRACTICE AND
THE U.S. HEALTH CARE SYSTEM 137, 142–43 (William M. Sage & Rogan Kersh eds., 2006).
42. See, e.g., Hearing Before the H. Energy and Commerce Comm., 2003 Gen. Assembly (Pa. 2003)
(testimony of Harvey Rosenfield, Found. for Taxpayer and Consumer Rights); Thomas Koenig &
Michael Rustad, His and Her Tort Reform: Gender Injustice in Disguise, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1, 77–86
(1995).
43. See NICHOLAS M. PACE ET AL., CAPPING NON-ECONOMIC AWARDS IN MEDICAL
MALPRACTICE TRIALS: CALIFORNIA JURY VERDICTS UNDER MICRA (2004); Studdert et al., supra
note 8.
44. Frank A. Sloan & Chee R. Hsieh, Variability in Medical Malpractice Payments: Is the
Compensation Fair?, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 997, 1019–20 (1990); Frank A. Sloan & Stephen S. van
Wert, Cost and Compensation of Injuries in Medical Malpractice, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 131, 133
(Winter 1991); Kenneth S. Abraham et al., Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury: Further
Reflections, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 333, 340 (1993).
45. Studdert et al., supra note 8, at 63; Michael M. Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the
Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147, 1218 (1992).
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reductions experienced by male and female plaintiffs, or elderly and nonelderly
plaintiffs.46
These studies buttress claims that the classic flat cap advances the goal of
horizontal equity of compensation at the expense of vertical equity and absolute
fairness. Many states have manifested discomfort with this implication of a “one
size fits all” cap by adopting a tiered cap that is tied to severity of injury.
The shortcomings of laws imposing flat caps, together with the extreme
political difficulty of passing caps legislation in some states, have stimulated
interest in a variety of alternative approaches to improving the consistency and
rationality of noneconomic damages.47 Damages schedules are the leading
alternative.48 Schedules are superior to flat dollar caps as a response to political
demands for greater proportionality in damages awards. They essentially build
on the existing model of the tiered cap, but differ from it in several respects: the
number of tiers, the basis of the tiering, and the establishment of a floor as well
as a ceiling for noneconomic damages in each tier. Schedules might be thought
of as the next generation of tiered caps—more sophisticated, principled, and
sensitive than their forebears.
IV
OPTIONS FOR SCHEDULING NONECONOMIC DAMAGES49
Scheduling refers to use of a matrix or table of damages. Conceptually, the
design of damages schedules involves two steps. First, injuries must be
combined into groups, or “tiered,” according to some incremental notion of
severity. Second, to specify or guide the monetary determination, dollar values
must be assigned to each tier.
A. Tiering and Valuation
The purpose of tiering is to group together into brackets injuries that are
considered similar on the basis of some severity metric. To promote horizontal
equity, the injuries grouped into each tier should be internally homogeneous
46. Studdert et al., supra note 8, at 62–63. See also PACE ET AL., supra note 44, at 30-3 (finding no
significant difference in the absolute or percentage reductions for elderly plaintiffs under California’s
non-economic damages cap, but finding an effect for gender in uncontrolled analyses).
47. For a review of some of the leading proposals, see Joseph Sanders, Why Do Proposals
Designed to Control Variability in General Damages (Generally) Fall on Deaf Ears? (And Why This Is
Too Bad), 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 489, 496–507 (2006).
48. Bovbjerg, supra note 8, at 936–38; James F. Blumstein et al., Beyond Tort Reform: Developing
Better Tools for Assessing Damages for Personal Injury, 8 YALE J. REG. 171, 172–74 (1991); Ronald J.
Allen et al., An External Perspective on the Nature of Noneconomic Compensatory Damages and Their
Regulation, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 1249, 1257–58, 1275 (2007); AM. LAW INST., supra note 40, at 320
(recommending guidelines “based on a scale of inflation-adjusted damage amounts attached to a
number of disability profiles that range in severity from the relatively moderate to the gravest
injuries”). The idea of scheduling awards for personal-injury litigation is not new. See, e.g., William
Zelermyer, Damages for Pain and Suffering, 6 SYRACUSE L. REV. 27, 41–42 (1955).
49. This part has been adapted from the TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 34–56. The report
provides greater detail about each of the scheduling options discussed in this part.
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with respect to the chosen severity metric. To promote vertical equity, the
groupings should be organized so that each tier represents an incremental
increase in severity relative to the one below it.50
Another way of describing the vertical-equity requirement is to say that
each tier has a numerical weight attached to it, and the weights should increase
as one travels up the tiers. Ideally, these weights should be quantified and
explicitly stated. Assigning these weights, or “relative values,”51 to each cell in
the schedule permits comparison of injuries in different cells, which is useful for
probing the validity of the scale. One can ask, for example, whether the loss of a
foot (an upper-tier injury) may be reasonably regarded as four times as bad, in
terms of noneconomic loss, as the loss of a finger (a lower-tier injury). The
pivotal challenge in creating tiers is determining what should form the basis of
the severity metric.
The next step, assignment of dollar values or ranges of dollar values to each
tier, defines the compensation levels across the severity gradient. Vertical
equity dictates that the slope of the gradient is positive. The principle of
absolute fairness guides the selection of the actual dollar values for each tier:
the values should represent a social judgment about reasonable (meaning not
inadequate and not excessive) compensation for the noneconomic losses arising
from injuries within each tier.
Splitting the construction of damages schedules into these two steps, and
presenting each as discrete and necessary in the construction of a damages
schedule, is helpful for purposes of elucidating the concept. However, it is an
oversimplification; not all of the candidate methodologies move through these
steps. For example, two possible approaches deliver tiers but do not address
dollar valuations;52 two other approaches effectively conflate the steps by
leaping straight to dollar-based valuations of loss as a basis for defining tiers.53
In addition, rather than generating tiers consisting of clusters of similar cases,
some approaches score health states along a continuous scale—in other words,
each injury has its own tier.54 Despite these departures, tiering and valuation as
discrete concepts remain a useful touchstone for articulating the core technical
challenges at hand.

50. An alternative approach would be to consider each injury individually but apply some kind of
formula to calculate damages. For example, a disability weight could be generated for each kind of
injury and then multiplied by some standard dollar value and the plaintiff’s remaining life expectancy.
This is a way of standardizing noneconomic damages, and achieves many of the same goals as
scheduling, but is not scheduling in a strict sense.
51. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 8, at 944. These authors provide an illustrative, forty-five-cell
schedule incorporating numerical weights. Id.
52. See infra Part IV.B.2 for a discussion of quantitative scales, and infra Part IV.B.4 for a
discussion of the health-utilities approach.
53. See infra Part IV.B.1 for a discussion of the precedential approach, and infra Part IV.B.5 for a
discussion of hedonic damages.
54. See discussion infra Part IV.B.3.a for the AMA Guides, infra Part IV.B.4 for the health-utilities
approach, and infra Part IV.B.5 for hedonic damages. This same point is made earlier, supra note 51.
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B. Options for Tiering Injuries
Five general approaches warrant consideration as the basis of a
noneconomic-damages schedule: (1) use of precedents, (2) quantitative
measures of injury severity, (3) qualitative measures of injury severity, (4) a
health-utilities approach, and (5) a hedonic-damages approach.55 This section
describes each of these approaches and summarizes their strengths and
weaknesses.
1. A Precedential Approach
One option for constructing schedules is to use previous noneconomicdamages awards.56 Precedential data could be provided to adjudicators in raw
form—little more than brief descriptions of the injuries considered in previous,
similar cases together with the noneconomic award the injury attracted and a
description of how the decisionmaker should use this information in
determining levels of damages. Alternatively, the information could be
provided in more-processed form: Similar cases could be clustered together,
perhaps with a characterization of their “type” alongside statistics such as
medians, averages, or ranges of noneconomic damages awarded in the past to
injuries in the same cluster.57
The precedential approach is already employed in some European
countries. For example, the United Kingdom’s Judicial Studies Board (JSB)
publishes Guidelines for the Assessment of Damages,58 a slim booklet now in its
55. This is not an exhaustive list of the proposals advanced by legal scholars. Ronen Avraham, for
example, has proposed a system of age-adjusted multipliers that would be applied to a plaintiff’s
medical expenses to produce the noneconomic-damages award. See generally Avraham, supra note 41.
We focus on the proposals that have attracted the most attention, in the literature or in practice in
compensation systems around the world, or appear to us to hold the most promise, or both.
56. Bovbjerg and colleagues have proposed a version of this approach. See Bovbjerg et al., supra
note 8, at 953–56. Others have made similar proposals. See, e.g., David Baldus et al., Improving Judicial
Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of
Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and Punitive Damages, 80 IOWA L. REV. 1109, 1143–53 (1994–1995);
Oscar G. Chase, Helping Jurors Determine Pain and Suffering Awards, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 763, 777–
82 (1995); Shari Seidman Diamond et al., Juror Judgments About Liability and Damages: Sources of
Variability and Ways To Increase Consistency, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 301, 320–22 (1998); Wissler et al.,
supra note 8.
57. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 8, at 953. Bovbjerg and colleagues have outlined a version of the
processed approach in which jurors are presented with “valuation scenarios” to use as benchmarks.
Standardized injury scenarios would be created to provide hypothetical “descriptions of the
prototypical circumstances of injury” and appropriate damages for each. The jury would be given a
range of scenarios, from relatively trivial to very severe injuries, and would choose the one that most
closely resembled the plaintiff’s injury. Bovbjerg and colleagues provide two examples of how a
hypothetical arm injury could be described in a scenario: (1) “Permanent minor injury (level 5). Life
expectancy 25 years. Mild persistent pain, usually controllable with aspirin. Unable to engage in more
than light housework.” (2) “Plaintiff Peters has completely and permanently lost the use of her left arm.
Her life expectancy is 25 years, according to standard life insurance tables. Her arm throbs painfully
most of the time, but the pain can usually be controlled with aspirin. She cannot do more than light
housework.” Id. at 954–55.
58. JUDICIAL STUDIES BOARD, GUIDELINES FOR THE ASSESSMENT OF GENERAL DAMAGES IN
PERSONAL INJURY CASES (2010); see also Giovanni Comande, Towards a Global Model for
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tenth edition, which sets forth a series of injury descriptions and provides a
range of monetary awards for general damages based on previous awards. The
JSB booklet, intended for judges and advocates, divides injuries into ten general
groups ranging from “injuries involving paralysis” to “facial injuries” and
“damage to hair”; these groups are further divided into forty subgroups. The
authors stress the following caveats: “[T]he Guidelines are intended to reflect
the general level of current awards; they do not reflect the views of [the
authors] on what the levels should be. They are designed to provide the starting
point for assessment of damages in any particular case.”59
Policymakers face a number of choices regarding the sources of precedent
used to establish a damages schedule of this kind. What types of noneconomicdamages valuations are appropriately included? Should precedents be limited
to jury determinations, or should settlement amounts also be included (setting
aside, for the moment, the substantial difficulties associated with obtaining this
data, since most settlements are private and confidential; and delineating
noneconomic damages, since settlements themselves rarely make this
explicit)?60 What is the acceptable time period from which to sample previous
cases? And should precedents be drawn only from decisions made in the same
state or jurisdiction, or from other jurisdictions as well?
A distinctive strength of the precedential approach is its faithfulness to the
original decisionmakers’ valuations of damages. But this coin has two sides. The
approach inherits whatever heuristics and inaccuracies attended those original
valuations, though in muted form, with extreme values attenuated through the
use of means or medians within tiers. The greater weakness, however—and a
fatal one for considering precedent, on its own, as a solid footing on which to
develop a schedule for noneconomic damages—is that it elides the question of
how injuries are ordered, lumped, and split into groups. In other words, it
sidesteps the tiering challenge. The only obvious grounds for delineation of
different injury groups are the dollar values themselves. But this is circular
logic: Reasoned judgments about what counts as an injury group do not flow
from data on previous awards. Thus, vertical and horizontal equity demand a
more defensible account of how levels of noneconomic harm differ than the
precedential approach can provide.

Adjudicating Personal Injury Damages: Bridging Europe and the United States, 19 TEMP. INT’L &
COMP. L.J. 241, 279–90 (2005) (discussing the use of these guidelines in the United Kingdom, and use of
a similar approach in Germany); Anthony J. Sebok, Translating the Immeasurable: Thinking About
Pain and Suffering Comparatively, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 379, 389 (2006) (same).
59. JUDICIAL STUDIES BOARD, supra note 58, at 2.
60. Viscusi and Bovbjerg and colleagues have argued that settlements should not be included
because these amounts are determined by a variety of considerations (aversion to the risks of trial,
attractiveness of witnesses, and so on) other than the magnitude of the noneconomic loss. Viscusi,
supra note 28, at 214–15; Bovbjerg et al., supra note 8, at 960–61 n.227.
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2. A Quantitative Approach
Standardized scales exist for grading the severity of injuries represented in
various kinds of insurance claims. These scales are characterized by general
descriptions of disability or injury at different levels, specified ex ante. They
have proven popular among researchers and claims-management systems in the
casualty-insurance industry because health states can be stratified using only
rudimentary clinical information.61
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners’ (NAIC) Severity of
Injury Scale62 is probably the best-known and most widely used quantitative
scale for classifying the severity of post-injury disability in compensation
practice and research.63 It divides disability into nine levels.64 The NAIC scale
has demonstrated good inter-rater reliability—that is, different people working
independently to rate injuries on the scale tend to assign them to the same
levels.65 However, several shortcomings are evident.
First, the scale orders severity crudely.66 It is not difficult to identify injuries
that the scale channels into low levels (for example, severe nervous
shocklevel 1) that, on any imaginable severity metric, easily surpass certain
injuries channeled into higher levels (for example, a fall in the hospital resulting
in a mild sprainlevel 3). In addition, with the exception of the death category,
the levels of the scale each tend to net injuries that have widely divergent
degrees of severity. For example, temporary emotional upset and severe
nervous shock would both fall in level 1. This is particularly problematic in the
lower tiers. These two forms of imprecision—the nonordinality and the breadth
of the levels in quantitative scales—strike directly at vertical and horizontal
equity, respectively.
The second weakness is evident in the preceding discussion. In applying the
NAIC and other quantitative scales, it is easy to slip into the vernacular of
physical injuries. Indeed, the scales steer one in that direction because they are
designed primarily to deal with functioning and disability. There is undoubtedly
61. See, e.g., Comande, supra note 58, at 309–14 (describing an Italian research project that created
a “Normalized Values Schedule” for noneconomic damages using information about the plaintiff’s age
and degree of disability).
62. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS, MALPRACTICE CLAIMS: FINAL COMPILATION 10 (1980).
63. For examples of other studies that have used it, see Bovbjerg et al., supra note 8, at 921–22, 937,
944; Studdert et al., supra note 8, at 57–60.
64. The levels are (1) emotional disability only (e.g., fright; no physical damage); (2) temporary
insignificant (lacerations, contusions, minor scars, rash; no delay in recovery); (3) temporary minor
(infections, missed fracture, fall in the hospital; delayed recovery); (4) temporary major (burns,
retained surgical material, drug side effect, brain damage; delayed recovery); (5) permanent minor (loss
of fingers, loss or damage to organs; includes nondisabling injuries); (6) permanent significant
(deafness, loss of limb, loss of eye, loss of one kidney or lung); (7) permanent major (paraplegia,
blindness, loss of two limbs, brain damage); (8) permanent grave (quadriplegia, severe brain damage,
lifelong care, fatal prognosis); and (9) death. NAT’L ASS’N OF INS. COMM’RS , supra note 62, at 10.
65. See, e.g., David M. Studdert et al., Geographic Variation in Informed Consent Law: Two
Standards for Disclosure of Treatment Risks, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 103, 111–12 (2007).
66. See Avraham, supra note 41, at 94 (noting that the scale “involves reducing dissimilar things to
similar categories and therefore eliminates, by definition, the nuances of the injury”).
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a strong correlation between an injury’s physical severity and the noneconomic
losses that accompany it. However, the correlation is imperfect, a reality often
overlooked in borrowing of quantitative scales designed for other purposes, and
for some injuries—scarring or disfigurement and loss of taste or smell, to take
several classic examples—there may be very little correlation.67 In these
circumstances, a scale based solely on physical attributes of the harm will
provide a poor measure of the underlying noneconomic loss, ignoring or
undervaluing nonphysical dimensions of harm that manifest through impacts on
mental health, appearance, mood, self-esteem, and general enjoyment of life.
Third, the NAIC scale does not, of itself, provide any basis or method for
valuing its nine levels in monetary terms. Whether this omission constitutes a
true weakness is debatable—shortly, this article will argue that it does not.
Nonetheless, it means that before such a scale could be fully implemented as a
damages schedule, some other principled basis for assigning dollar values to its
tiers is needed.
3. A Qualitative Approach
An alternative approach to scheduling accepts at the outset that
noneconomic losses are intrinsically unscalable through any detached
assessment of injury groups. This approach posits that any rational tiering of
noneconomic loss depends upon subjective, case-by-case judgments. The
challenge thus becomes how to ensure these judgments are coherent,
reproducible, and perceived as fair. Structured qualitative assessments and
group consensus sit at the heart of this approach.68
Of course, determinations of noneconomic loss by juries, litigants, and
others in the current system involve qualitative assessments and group
consensus too, so why is this not merely a restatement of the status quo? Two
factors differentiate the qualitative approach to noneconomic losses described
here from the present style of decisionmaking. First, the judgments are
structured. A decisionmaking “tool” guides subjective determinations about
injury severity in particular cases and then provides a mechanism for
transposing those determinations into tiers on a pre-specified scale. Second,
most examples of this approach involve decisions by panels of experts, not
laypersons. The expert panels feed clinical experience and scientific data into
the process, even though their final determination is not tethered in any rigid
way to these underlying sources of “objectivity.”

67. Studdert et al., supra note 8, at 61–63.
68. Another way of characterizing the qualitative approach is that it conceives the task of assigning
injuries into tiers as the paramount challenge; the scale itself cannot encapsulate this wisdom.
Quantitative approaches, by contrast, emphasize the scale and tend to ignore or relegate the
importance of decisionmaking during the assignment process.
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We consider the two examples of the qualitative approach: the American
Medical Association’s Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment69
(AMA Guides) and the damages panels used in some Scandinavian countries.
a. The AMA Guides
The leading example of the qualitative approach is the AMA Guides, a
structured tool for grading permanent “impairment,” defined as “a loss, loss of
use, or derangement of any body part, organ system, or organ function.”70 Use
of this tool leads to ratings, first expressed as a percentage loss of function for
the particular organ system under examination, and then translated into
“whole-person impairment ratings.”71
The ratings are a product of clinical decisionmaking at two levels.72 First, the
rating “weights” for specific conditions are set and revised periodically by
multiple panels of physicians with clinical expertise relevant to each organ
system. The panels reportedly pay close attention to available clinical and
scientific data about various injuries in reaching their conclusions about these
weights. Second, a treating or examining physician must perform each specific
evaluation, determining the impairment rating based on direct clinical
examination of the individual being rated.
The Guides has become an industry. In many of the busiest injurycompensation schemes found in developed countries—in particular, those
covering workplace and transport accidents—the Guides, or local adaptations
of them, dominate the assessments of severity for permanent injuries. In the
United States, 46 states and several federal employee compensation systems
either mandate or recommend use of the Guides to determine the amount and
duration of workers’ compensation permanent partial disability (PPD)
benefits.73 The assumption is that the impairment ratings provide a reasonable
proxy for the extent of disability, even though the Guides’ preamble states
explicitly that its system of impairment ratings “is not intended to be used for
direct estimates of work participation restrictions.”74

69. AM. MED. ASS’N, GUIDES TO THE EVALUATION OF PERMANENT IMPAIRMENT (Christopher
R. Brigham and Robert D. Rondinelli eds., 6th ed. 2008).
70. Id. at 5.
71. Emily Spieler and colleagues have described the purpose in greater detail:
For example, amputation of the index finger of either hand is considered a 20% impairment of
the whole hand, an 18% impairment of the upper extremity, and an 11% WPI [Whole Person
Impairment]. Finally, the Guides combines multiple WPIs into a single rating by using the
formula [A + B(1 - A)], where A is the rating for the first impairment and B is the rating for
the subsequent impairment, thus creating an asymptotic curve toward 100%.
Emily A. Spieler et al., Recommendations To Guide Revision of the Guides to the Evaluation of
Permanent Impairment, 283 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 519, 519 (2000) (internal citations omitted).
72. The process by which ratings are determined is described in AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 69, at
19–28.
73. AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 69, at 20.
74. AM. MED. ASS’N, supra note 69, at 6.
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Do the Guides’ ratings constitute a reasonable measure of noneconomic
losses associated with injuries? Several of their features suggest that they may.
The ratings are supposed to reflect the degree to which the impairment
decreases the individual’s ability to move and perform common “activities of
daily living” (for example, personal hygiene, eating, sexual function, and
sleep).75 Moreover, the ratings purport to recognize both objective
manifestations of impairments (for example, bone fracture) and subjective ones
(for example, fatigue and pain). In fact, the Guides have been criticized for
wandering beyond the stated focus on impairment into much-broader
conceptions of disability, which are influenced by the social, personal, and
psychological consequences of the impairment.76 To the extent that the Guides
have so wandered, their case for being reasonable proxies for noneconomic loss
is bolstered.
On the other hand, several features of the Guides suggest otherwise. First,
many concerns have been raised about the internal validity and reliability of
Guides’ ratings.77 Assessment of pain, for example, is considered inconsistent
across parts of the Guides.78 Second, the Guides have been criticized for the
validity of their impairment ratings on the grounds that their approach
emphasizes certain activities, functions, and tasks over others without justifying
those choices.79 Third, the Guides suffer from incompleteness: Some states of
impairment are not represented, including all temporary impairments and some
permanent impairments.80 Finally, despite the seriousness with which the Guides
take the qualitative measurement of injury severity, there is some empirical
evidence to suggest that they do not correlate well with how laypersons
perceive the effects of different injuries on quality of life, particularly at the
lower end of the scale.81
b. Scandinavian Damages Panels
In Sweden and Denmark, expert panels are entrusted with the task of
scaling noneconomic losses associated with various injuries. Their valuations
are used as the basis for determining noneconomic damages in both the civil
justice system and administrative compensation systems in these countries.82
75. Id. at 6–7.
76. Spieler et al., supra note 71, at 520.
77. Id. at 520–22 (reviewing such criticisms and citing relevant sources).
78. Id. at 522.
79. Ellen S. Pryor, Flawed Promises: A Critical Evaluation of the American Medical Association’s
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, 103 HARV. L. REV. 964, 964–73 (1990). Pryor
argues that gender bias is one nuance of some of the judgments made in the Guides. Id. at 969–72.
80. Spieler et al., supra note 71, at 522.
81. See generally Sandra Sinclair & John F. Burton, Measuring Non-economic Loss: Quality-of-Life
Values Versus Impairment Ratings, WORKERS’ COMPENSATION MONITOR, July–Aug. 1994, at 1;
Sandra Sinclair & John F. Burton, A Response to the Comments by Doege and Hixson, WORKERS’
COMPENSATION MONITOR, July–Aug. 1997, at 13.
82. The Swedish patient-insurance schemean administrative, no-fault compensation system for
medical injuriesprovides two kinds of noneconomic damages: a “pain-and-suffering payment” to
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The panels consider detailed information on previously adjudicated injuries,
create generic descriptions of injury types of comparable severity, and proceed
to determine a percentage-disability rating for each type. The percentagedisability rating is then applied to a maximum compensation amount, set
annually by the governments, to calculate noneconomic damages for permanent
injuries.83
The unavailability of primary-source materials in English limits this article’s
evaluation of the Scandinavian injury scales, but a few observations are
possible. One strength of the Scandinavian approach, like other qualitative
scales, is that it avoids losing sight of the sort of nuances in grading
noneconomic losses that may arise in assessments that are overly detached or
objective. A second potential strength is political legitimacy. If the
decisionmaking group is trusted and broadly representative, some lack of
explicitness in how the scale is established may be accepted based on the
perception that a fair process led to its creation.
On the other hand, the Scandinavian approach is grounded heavily in expert
judgments about loss. Even if the expert group is trusted, a question arises as to
whether clinical experts are the appropriate parties to value noneconomic loss.
Many commentators have argued that in valuations of noneconomic losses,
clinical expertise may be useful, but carries no obvious primacy over lay
perspectives.84 (Of course, this criticism also applies to the AMA Guides.)
Finally, the basis for the different ratings or tiers in the Scandinavian scales
remains somewhat obscure, as does the nature of the actual loss being ranked.
In theory, the scales represent degrees of disability, or perhaps only functional
impairment. Certainly they do not attempt to capture pain and suffering as
Anglo-American legal systems would understand that concept, nor do they
attempt to measure some broader notion of quality of life.

compensate patients for the pain they feel during the acute period of the injury, and a “disability
payment” that is available for permanent or chronic injuries after the acute period ends. The disability
payment might be considered a payment for lost quality of life because it compensates for permanent
functional impairment and supplements what the patient receives from other social-insurance sources
to cover his economic losses. The payments are determined by a schedule, although there are some
supplementary payments available for special treatments such as hospitalization in an intensive-care
unit. The schedule is set by the Traffic Injuries Board and approved by the courts. See Patricia Danzon,
The Swedish Patient Compensation System: Lessons for the United States, 15 J. LEGAL MED. 199, 203
(1994). The Danish system is patterned after the Swedish approach.
83. Courts in France and Italy have employed a somewhat similar approach, with scales developed
by experts linked to dollar amounts drawn from previous awards across groups of cases. See Giovanni
Comande, supra note 58, at 286–94; Sebok, supra note 58, at 389.
84. See, e.g., Sanjeebit J. Jachuck et al., The Effect of Hypotensive Drugs on the Quality of Life, 32
J. ROYAL C. GEN. PRAC. 103, 104–05 (1982); Mirjam A.G. Sprangers et al., The Role of Health Care
Providers and Significant Others in Evaluating the Quality of Life of Patients with Chronic Disease: A
Review, 45(7) J. CLINICAL EPIDEMIOLOGY 743, 744 (1992); Alain Leplège and Sonia Hunt, The
Problem of Quality of Life in Medicine, 278 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 47, 48–49 (1997); Marthe R. Gold et al.,
Identifying and Valuing Outcomes, in COST-EFFECTIVENESS IN HEALTH AND MEDICINE 82, 98–106
(Marthe R. Gold et al. eds., 1996).
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4. A Health-Utilities Approach
Health economics provides a fourth alternative for scaling noneconomic
losses, based on more than forty years of work valuing health outcomes in
assessments of programs and interventions in public health and medicine.85 A
parallel stream of work has developed similar methods to quantify the severity
of health states for a different purpose: measuring the population health burden
of diseases and injuries.86 Collectively, these efforts have produced a diversity of
related concepts and techniques for assigning numerical weights to health
outcomes (for example, “health-related quality of life weights,” “healthutilities,” and “disability weights”).87 However, these concepts and techniques
share a number of basic features that are relevant to the design of damages
schedules.88
First, the measures are intended to capture health outcomes and to exclude
strictly economic factors, although the extent to which this exclusion is made
explicit in the measurement instruments has varied.89 Second, the measurement
techniques all produce weights on a cardinal scale anchored by perfect health
and death at 1 and 0, respectively.90 Third, the outcome weights are combined
with estimates of the duration of time lived with a particular outcome in order
to construct time-based summary measures of health, in units of qualityadjusted life years (QALYs) or disability-adjusted life years (DALYs).91 A
common motivation for the development and application of QALY and DALY
measures has been to inform priority setting and resource allocation in public
health.

85. See generally JOHN BRAZIER ET AL., MEASURING AND VALUING HEALTH BENEFITS FOR
ECONOMIC EVALUATION (2007); MICHAEL F. DRUMMOND ET AL., METHODS FOR THE ECONOMIC
EVALUATION OF HEALTH CARE PROGRAMMES (3d ed. 2005).
86. See generally THE GLOBAL BURDEN OF DISEASE (Christopher J.L. Murray & Alan D. Lopez
eds., 1996).
87. In this article, we use “health-utilities” as shorthand for the range of related efforts in this area,
although many health economists would reject this choice based on a narrower understanding of the
term as referring only to measures collected using particular measurement techniques consistent with
expected-utility theory.
88. During the life of our study, other scholars have published articles making this connection. See
Peter A. Ubel & George Loewenstein, Pain and Suffering Awards: They Shouldn’t Be (Just) About
Pain and Suffering, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S195, S208–S211 (2008); Lars Noah, Comfortably Numb:
Medicalizing (and Mitigating) Pain-and-Suffering Damages, 42 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 431, 446–48
(2009). Ubel and Loewenstein propose a tiering and valuation process that is very similar to the one
outlined in this article. Ubel & Loewenstein, supra, at S208–S211.
89. Ensuring the quality-of-life consequences of a health state net of its financial consequences
may be important for application of the health-utilities framework to noneconomic damages, because
this component of the award would be in addition to an economic-damages figure, which is separately
calculated.
90. The locations of perfect health and death at the two anchor points are reversed in the two main
applications, economic evaluations of health interventions and burden-of-disease measures. The former
typically use “positive” scales in which 1 represents the best outcome and 0 represents death, whereas
the latter reflect “negative” scaling in which 1 is the maximum loss, equivalent to death.
91. See generally Gold et al., supra note 84, at 89–94; Christopher Murray, Rethinking DALYs, in
THE GLOBAL BURDEN OF DISEASE, supra note 86, at 1–98.
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There are two main approaches to describing outcomes in order to elicit
health-utility measures. The first approach relies on short, narrative vignettes
that describe the most salient symptoms and consequences of actual health
outcomes. The second approach disaggregates health states to a greater degree;
it uses a generic, standardized descriptive system comprising a set of health and
functioning dimensions (for example, mobility, cognition, and pain), with an
associated ordinal scale that describes different levels of performance or
capacity on each dimension. In the latter approach, any given outcome may be
described by a “profile,” consisting of a score on each dimension in the system
experienced by a typical person with the given outcome.
The advantage of the vignette approach is that descriptions can be highly
comprehensive and address specific injury outcomes. The principal advantages
of the generic approach are parsimony and flexibility; use of a standardized
descriptive system may be paired with a scoring rule so that predicted utilities
may then be generated for any possible combination of levels in the system
without having to measure these utilities directly. A variety of standardized
descriptive systems with scoring rules have been developed and calibrated
through physician and general-population surveys.92
Although the health-utilities approach has produced various catalogs of
weights for a wide range of health outcomes,93 the availability of specific weights
for outcomes associated with injuries remains relatively limited.94 There have
been some initial attempts to use quality-of-life measures to value injuries in the
civil justice system, including injuries due to assaults,95 consumer-product
defects,96 and drunk driving.97 But QALYs and DALYs have never been applied
as a basis for scaling noneconomic losses in the context of personal-injury
litigation. Is such an application feasible? As a technical matter, it should be.
The merit of this approach, however, is another matter.
The health-utilities approach has two major strengths. First, it has the
potential to yield a scale that orders a broad range of injuries according to
direct consideration of levels of noneconomic losses, as opposed to scales that

92. BRAZIER ET AL., supra note 85, at 175–256.
93. See generally Tammy O. Tengs & Amy Wallace, One Thousand Health-Related Quality-of-Life
Estimates, 38 MED. CARE 583 (2000); Patrick W. Sullivan & Vahram Ghushchyan, Preference-Based
EQ-5D Index Scores for Chronic Conditions in the United States, 26 MED. DECISION MAKING 410
(2006). See also the searchable database at the Ctr. for the Evaluation of Value and Risk in Health,
CEA REGISTRY WEBSITE, https://research.tufts-nemc.org/cear4/Default.aspx (last visited Feb. 6, 2011).
94. Juanita A. Haagsma et al., Novel Empirical Disability Weights To Assess the Burden of Nonfatal Injury, 14 INJ. PREVENTION 5, 5 (2008); See generally Ted R. Miller & David T. Levy, CostOutcome Analysis in Injury Prevention and Control: Eighty-Four Recent Estimates for the United States,
38 MED. CARE 562 (2000).
95. See generally TED R. MILLER ET AL., VICTIM COSTS AND CONSEQUENCES—A NEW LOOK
(1996).
96. See generally TED R. MILLER ET AL., THE CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION’S
REVISED INJURY COST MODEL: FINAL REPORT (2000).
97. See generally Stan V. Smith, Jury Verdicts and the Dollar Value of Human Life, 13 J. FORENSIC
ECON. 169 (2000).
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use some proxy for those losses (such as percentage impairment or severity of
physical injury) or that mix noneconomic and economic consequences of the
injury. Second, the approach is innovative in that it embeds what are essentially
subjective judgments within standardized empirical methods. The utility weights
themselves come from individuals’ preferences about health states; but these
preferences are then averaged across persons to derive weights that are applied
to ensure similar injuries are handled in a similar way. No other approach
hybridizes subjective and objective elements as effectively.
A weakness of the health-utilities approach, on the other hand, is that it is
grounded in the theory of welfare economics and makes several basic
assumptions. Namely, it assumes that utilities depend only on health
consequences and not on other personal characteristics or the risk involved,
that they can be derived through preference-elicitation techniques (as
administered, for example, via focus groups and surveys), and that they are
amenable to aggregation and averaging.98 These are not uncontroversial
assumptions.
Another weakness of this approach, from a political perspective, is its
complexity. Concepts such as utility preferences and QALYs are not easily
grasped, and obscure formulas may be seen as a threat to the independence of
existing decisionmakers in the tort system, particularly juries. These factors
could make for a difficult sell to legislators. A further complication is that the
generic, standardized descriptive systems described above may not be well
suited to capturing the most salient aspects of injuries, especially the types of
injuries that arise commonly in personal-injury litigation. Architects of a healthutilities-based malpractice-damages schedule likely would have to develop new
descriptive systems. Finally, like all other approaches considered so far except
the precedential approach, health utilities provide the basis for tiers, but do not
furnish dollar valuations. If a one-to-one mapping from the utilities scale to
dollar valuations is considered acceptable, then the measurement task simplifies
to identifying an appropriate “exchange rate” of dollars for utility increments.
However, setting that exchange rate calls for another set of difficult choices.
5. A Hedonic-Damages Approach
Courts have long awarded damages for “loss of enjoyment of life.”
Traditionally, this form of loss was considered an element of noneconomic
harm, alongside pain, mental anguish, disfigurement, loss of consortium, and so
on. Hence, it formed part of a general award for noneconomic damages.
Beginning in the mid-1980s, however, courts began considering loss of
enjoyment of life as a separate component of damages, with some explicitly
using the term “hedonic damages.”99

98. James K. Hammitt, QALYs Versus WTP, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 983, 987–89, 994–97 (2002).
99. See, e.g., Sherrod v. Berry, 629 F. Supp. 159 (N.D. Ill. 1985), aff’d, 827 F.2d 1985 (7th Cir. 1987),
vacated on other grounds and remanded, 835 F.2d 1222 (7th Cir. 1988) (allowing expert testimony on
hedonic damages in a civil-rights action for wrongful death).
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Only a handful of states recognize hedonic damages today,100 although the
number appears to be growing.101 The legitimacy of hedonic damages as a
separate type of loss is hotly disputed, with critics arguing that the losses
hedonic damages purport to compensate overlap to an unacceptable degree
with losses already covered by general damages.102 There are other criticisms as
well.103 Many state supreme courts have yet to rule on the issue.104
Although hedonic damages are controversial, and the “expert” methods
used to calculate them even more so, they bear special relevance to the
consideration of alternative bases for scheduling for two reasons. First,
depending on how fully one subscribes to the critics’ view, the losses hedonic
damages purport to capture either overlap with, or are closely related to, the
concept of noneconomic loss. Second, proponents of hedonic damages have
outlined a specific methodology for their calculation. This methodology is
highly ambitious in that it simultaneously provides both features of the
noneconomic damages schedule: tiers and dollar values for those tiers.
An instrument called the lost-pleasure-of-life (LPL) scale105 has gained a
degree of currency in the ranking and weighting of hedonic losses. It is based on
a scale used by mental health professionals to assess patients’ degree of
functioning and severity of stress.106 The LPL scale ranges from 0 to 100, with 0
signifying no loss of functioning and 100 signifying that the individual has no
meaningful functioning and cannot derive pleasure from life. To arrive at the
score, a mental-health professional compares the individual’s pre- and postinjury states in four domains of functioning: (1) practical functioning,
(2) emotional or psychological functioning, (3) social functioning, and

100. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537, 545 (2005)
(listing five states that permit damages for hedonic loss).
101. Victor E. Schwartz & Cary Silverman, Hedonic Damages: The Rapidly Bubbling Cauldron, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 1037, 1039, 1046 (2004).
102. Id. at 1046; see also Kyle R. Crowe, The Semantical Bifurcation of Noneconomic Loss, 75 IOWA
L. REV. 1275, 1302 (1990); Susan Poser et al., Measuring Damages for Lost Enjoyment of Life: The
View from the Bench and the Jury Box, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53, 54–56 (2003) (reviewing some
judicial rejections of lost enjoyment of life as a separate head of damages).
103. Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 101, at 1044–69, review several other criticisms of hedonic
damages, including the following: (1) they provide a means of avoiding established liability rules, such
as limits on punitive damages and the “cognitive awareness” requirement that has long been a
requirement of noneconomic damages; (2) the basis of their calculation is scientifically unsound; and
(3) the totals reached are too vague as to permit meaningful appellate review.
104. Even among courts that have permitted separate recovery of hedonic damages, most agree that
expert testimony as to their magnitude is not permitted, especially in the wake of the Daubert decision,
and hedonic damages are generally not available in wrongful death or survival actions. See, e.g., Saia v.
Sears Roebuck, 47 F. Supp. 2d 141 (D. Mass. 1999); see also Schwartz & Silverman, supra note 101, at
1064–65; Reuben E. Slesinger, The Demise of Hedonic Damages Claims in Tort Litigation, 6 J. LEGAL
ECON. 17, 23–26 (1996).
105. See generally Edward P. Berlá et al., Hedonic Damages and Personal Injury: A Conceptual
Approach, 3 J. FORENSIC ECON. 1 (1990). The LPL scale and illustrative examples of each level are
available in the TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 52.
106. AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 11, 18–19 (2000).
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(4) occupational functioning (which refers not to lost wages, but to a person’s
ability to engage in the career of his or her choice and derive nonmonetary
pleasure from it).107 The individual receives a percentage score in each domain,
representing the clinician’s judgment of the specific injury’s effect on the
injured individual’s pre-injury health status, and its probable effect on the
individual’s future life.108 In some respects, the LPL scale is similar to the AMA
Guides, except that the focus of the assessment is narrower and more explicit:
loss of enjoyment of life.
After scoring on the LPL scale is complete, the scorecard is submitted to a
forensic economist for conversion to dollar estimates of damages.109 The
monetary measures applied to the scores come from contingent-valuation
studies110—investigations of people’s preferences for health risks of varying
degrees—or from “revealed preference” studies, in which money-risk tradeoffs
are inferred from market data, such as wage-risk tradeoffs in labor markets.111
This general approach to valuations is often referred to as “willingness to pay”
because it seeks to determine how much people are prepared to pay (or
receive) to avoid (or accept) exposure to certain risks.112 When willingness-topay analyses are trained on fatal outcomes, it is possible to derive estimates of
the value of a statistical life. For example, estimates from studies based on labor
market data have ranged from $700,000 to more than $9 million.113 Most
estimates of the value of a statistical life land in the $3–$9 million dollar range.114
Once the value of a statistical life is determined, the value of a nonfatal injury
or health condition is calculated by multiplying the value of a statistical life by
the percentage-point loss in pleasure of life resulting from the injury or
condition.115
One advantage of the hedonic-damages approach as a basis for a
noneconomic schedule is that it provides a one-stop shop: a methodology for
both tiering and valuing losses within a single framework. An additional
107. Paul Andrews et al., Development of the Lost Pleasure of Life Scale, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
99, 101 (1996).
108. The percentage need not be static. Taking into account the time elapsed after the injury and
the age of the individual, the rater may downgrade the percentage over time. For example, the impact
of a debilitating leg injury sustained by a fifty-year-old man will change as he moves into higher age
brackets where he would be expected to have limited mobility for other reasons.
109. The LPL measure takes the form of a continuous value. The mechanics of monetizing this
value have been described in various ways, but the simplest method involves multiplying an overall
LPL percentage by a single dollar value of a statistical life.
110. Stan V. Smith, Evaluating the Loss of Enjoyment of Life—Hedonic Damages, in ANALYSIS,
UNDERSTANDING AND PRESENTATION OF CASES INVOLVING TRAUMATIC BRAIN INJURY 429. 432
(Charles N. Simkins ed., 1994).
111. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life in Legal Contexts: Survey and Critique. 2 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
195, 196–201 (2000).
112. For a concise review of proposals for application of willingness-to-pay studies to the calculation
of noneconomic damages, see Lars Noah, supra note 88, at 445–48.
113. See Viscusi, supra note 111, at 206.
114. See id. at 205.
115. Id.
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strength is that the concept of lost enjoyment of life almost certainly comes
closer than general measures of physical-injury severity to the notion of pain
and suffering that noneconomic damages are supposed to capture.
A weakness it shares with the health-utilities approach, on the other hand, is
the difficulty of explaining it in a way that laypersons can comprehend and
accept. Loss of enjoyment of life is an understandable concept, but the
intricacies of contingent-valuation studies are less so. A further problem is that
courts in several jurisdictions have rejected hedonic damages, and the approach
(especially the willingness-to-pay valuation method) remains controversial even
among jurisdictions that have recognized it.
Further, academic critiques of willingness-to-pay studies abound. These
critiques include charges that contingent-valuation studies are of limited use
because they (1) tend to measure only small risks, (2) are regressive and
discriminatory because respondents’ willingness to pay is naturally constrained
by the resources they have at their disposal, (3) place too heavy a reliance on
data collected for other purposes, and (4) are imprecise, as evidenced by widely
varying estimates of the value of a statistical life.116
C. Which Approach Works Best?
Table 1 summarizes the strengths and weaknesses of the five approaches
reviewed in the previous section as rival bases for a noneconomic-damages
schedule. Considering the mix of pros and cons across the options, the healthutilities approach stands out as superior. Its key strengths—the conceptual fit
between quality-of-life measures and noneconomic loss, the robustness and
sophistication of the methodology, and the blending of subjective value
judgments with standardization—are an impressive array.117

116. See Dennis C. Taylor, Note, Your Money or Your Life?: Thinking About the Use of
Willingness-to-Pay Studies To Calculate Hedonic Damages, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1519, 1546–51
(1994) (briefly summarizing some of the academic literature); Abel, supra note 6, at 300 (noting several
problems with willingness-to-pay measures as a device for calculating noneconomic damages). For a
more technical review of the criticisms, see generally Richard Raymond, The Use, or Abuse, of Hedonic
Value-of-Life Estimates in Personal Injury and Death Cases, 9 J. LEGAL ECON. 69 (1999–2000).
117. Ubel and Loewenstein identify an additional argument in favor of the health-utilities approach
vis-à-vis alternatives that focus more narrowly on functioning and objective outcomes. The latter will
tend to overlook the well-documented capacity of injured persons’ to adapt to their disabilities
(“hedonic adaptation”), resulting in inappropriately low valuations of their losses. Ubel &
Loewenstein, supra note 88, at 205–07.
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Table 1: Options for Scheduling Noneconomic Damages118
Approach

Strengths
 Faithful to original source of
decisions

Precedential

 Promotes consistency by reducing
“outlier” values and dispersion
around the mean
 Likely to be the most politically
acceptable basis for scheduling

Quantitative
Scales

 Provides an explicit basis for
grading injury severity
 Widely used in other settings
 Process of assigning injuries into
tiers shown to be reproducible
 Takes seriously the complexity
and value judgments associated
with assigning particular injuries
to tiers

Qualitative
Scales

 Avoids the perceived danger of
trying to “quantify the
unquantifiable”
 If the decisionmaking group is
trusted and broadly
representative and the process
perceived as fair, some lack of
explicitness about the scaling
basis may be acceptable
 Captures well the concept of pain
and suffering

HealthUtilities
Index

 Innovative blending of subjective
valuations with empirical
standardization
 Methods are robust, well
developed and sophisticated

Hedonic
Damages

 Provides a methodology for
addressing both tiering and
valuations within a single
framework
 Concept of lost enjoyment of life
probably comes close to notion of
pain and suffering

Weaknesses
 To the extent inappropriate
considerations drove the original
valuations, they are preserved
albeit in muted form
 Problems in collecting
precedential information
 Elides the tiering challenge
 Existing scales tier crudely
 Tendency to focus exclusively on
physical aspects of injuries; may
not adequately capture pain and
suffering

 Basis for tiers remains obscure,
as may the nature of the loss
being scaled
 Existing scales are grounded
heavily in expert judgments
about loss, but clinical expertise
carries no obvious primacy over
lay perspectives for key parts of
the scaling decision

 Health-utilities scales remain
relatively undeveloped for
injuries
 Untested in context of damages
 Complexity

 Methodology is controversial
and has been rejected by courts
in many jurisdictions
 Complexity

The complexity of the health-utilities approach is probably its greatest
weakness, and will inevitably pose challenges for acceptance and uptake by
118. Adapted from the TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 19–20.
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lawmakers and the public. The failure of the approach to provide a basis for
applying dollar values to injuries may be considered a disadvantage at one level.
There is a fairly compelling counterargument, though: Resolving valuations
outside the technical rubric of a schedule is appropriate if one accepts that they
raise intensely political and normative questions—questions that are better
dealt with in other forums and by other means.119
The other notable weaknesses—underdevelopment of health utilities that
relate to specific types of injuries found in injury-compensation systems, and the
untested nature of this approach—are not fatal flaws. They are solvable, at least
in theory, and the next part of this article takes some initial steps toward
tackling them.
V
BUILDING A HEALTH-UTILITIES-BASED INDEX FOR TIERING NONECONOMIC
LOSSES: PROOF OF CONCEPT
A. Overview
The main purpose of the following empirical analysis is “proof of concept.”
We developed a prototype schedule for noneconomic damages based on healthutility measures in order to illustrate some of the main ideas behind this
approach, as well as to demonstrate the technical feasibility. The chief challenge
in constructing this prototype schedule was that detailed health-utility measures
are unavailable for the types of injuries encountered in personal-injury
compensation systems generally, and medical-malpractice litigation in
particular. Therefore, the schedule that follows is based on data from a study of
noneconomic loss associated with work-related injuries, the Ontario
Noneconomic Loss Study (ONELS).
In the ONELS, a large sample of injured Canadian workers rated lost
quality of life associated with seventy-eight health conditions that were selected
to represent consequences of common workplace injuries.120 The ONELS
injuries are quite different from the typical kinds of injuries seen in medicalinjury compensation systems. Taking advantage of these ratings, therefore,
required developing a method for “crosswalking,” or calibrating, them against
other types of injuries. This was done in several steps, which are detailed in this
part.
To summarize, the calibration process began by subjecting the conditions
studied in the ONELS to a fresh review. Two reviewers rated several specific
quality-of-life dimensions of each condition.121 The objective here was to

119. Ubel & Loewenstein, supra note 88, at 210–11.
120. Sinclair & Burton, Measuring Non-Economic Loss, supra note 81, at 5; Sinclair & Burton, A
Response to the Comments by Doege and Hixson, supra note 81, at 15.
121. As opposed to rating the condition as a whole, as participants in the ONELS had done in their
valuations.
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decompose the ONELS conditions into constituent quality-of-life dimensions.
Next, using multivariable linear regression analysis, we regressed the original
ONELS ratings on our ratings of the same conditions by quality-of-life
dimensions to estimate each of the dimensions’ predictive importance in the
overall rating the workers had given it. The resulting coefficients of the
dimensions thus became modular and transferrable to other types of injuries, at
least in theory. To test their generalizability, we applied them to another set of
injuries—a small sample of health conditions caused by medical malpractice—
to obtain a health-utility-based noneconomic loss score for each of the
malpractice injuries.
B. Ontario Noneconomic Loss Study: Background and Design
In the mid-1980s, the Workers’ Compensation Board of Ontario (WCB)122
initiated a massive study to improve understanding of how workplace injuries
affected quality of life, independent of their financial impact on workers in
terms of lost wages, out-of-pocket medical expenses, and other forms of
economic loss.123 The impetus for the study was a change in WCB’s approach to
compensating “permanent impairments”—injuries and diseases that gave rise to
enduring, lifelong disability. Traditionally, the WCB had awarded a general
pension to claimants with permanent impairments; this covered all losses in a
nonspecific way. In the late 1980s, the agency moved to a more explicit
approach in which the two main components of awards—wage loss (past and
future) and noneconomic loss—were configured as separate lines of
compensation.124
Explicit estimation of noneconomic losses in this revised approach
presented a new challenge for the WCB. Out of concern that the conventional
tool for grading impairment, the AMA Guides, would not be sufficiently
sensitive to grade “pure” noneconomic losses, policymakers in Ontario sought
to derive alternative bases for measuring and compensating this branch of
losses. Thus, the ONELS was born.
Despite the substantial financial investment needed to complete the
ONELS, and the enormous effort by participants and researchers it required,
findings from the study made barely a ripple. The work did not lead to any
major scientific publications, nor did it reshape compensation policy in Ontario.
The study’s timing was bad. By the early 1990s, Ontario was in a deep recession.
The minority provincial government that won power in Ontario in 1990 faced a
huge public deficit. There was little appetite in Toronto for innovative social
policy, particularly reforms with the potential to hike public expenditures. The
ONELS was perceived as having that potential by highlighting under-

122. The WCB is now the Workplace Safety and Insurance Board (WSIB).
123. Sinclair & Burton, Measuring Non-economic Loss, supra note 81, at 1–2.
124. Id.

STUDDERT, KACHALIA, SALOMON, & MELLO

84

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

4/30/2011

[Vol. 74:57

compensation of noneconomic losses among certain classes of WCB claimants.
Its findings were shelved.
The ONELS was conducted by WCB researchers and overseen by a
committee of eminent experts in workers’ compensation, health economics,
decision science, law, and medicine. The study had several parts, but its core
component was a survey of nearly ten-thousand workers who had sustained
permanent impairments.125 The survey was conducted between August 1988 and
January 1991.126
Surveys took an average of thirty minutes and were conducted face-to-face.
The ONELS staff presented each participant with several health conditions,
randomly sampled from a master-set of seventy-eight benchmark conditions.127
All were consequences of common workplace injuries.128
The conditions were presented in an audiovisual format.129 Each video
portrays at least two injured workers with the relevant condition. A neutral
voice narrates, describing in lay terms the medical condition, its symptoms, and
the permanent limitations associated with it. The accompanying video footage
shows the injured workers working with an occupational or physical therapist
and demonstrating how they go about various activities of daily life, coping with
some tasks and struggling with others. The subjects portrayed in the videos
were actually workers with the injuries described, interacting with their
therapists, although the interaction itself was staged for purposes of the video
shoot. Therapists advised on the content of the presentations in which they
were involved, and helped to identify and recruit suitable patients to showcase
the benchmark condition of interest. Each patient was two to five years postinjury.
After watching a video, ONELS participants were asked to rate, using a
visual analogue scale, the loss of enjoyment of life they believed they would
experience if they were living with the condition portrayed. Instructions
specified that they should consider loss of enjoyment of life independent of any
economic considerations (in other words, as if they were fully insured for any

125. The sampling frame was 12,000 injured workers. Sinclair & Burton, Measuring Non-economic
Loss, supra note 81, at 5. Seventy-two percent of those approached consented to participation in the
study (authors’ own calculations).
126. Sinclair & Burton, Measuring Non-economic Loss, supra note 81, at 1–2.
127. The one exception to random assignment was that researchers checked the selected conditions,
randomly replacing selections as necessary, to ensure that respondents would not view a video of a
condition that was the same or similar to their own.
128. The benchmark conditions had been selected by the researchers in consultation with WCB
physicians with extensive knowledge of workplace injuries. They were designed to capture conditions
commonly seen in workers’ compensation claims, and to cover a broad range of permanent injuries in
terms of type and severity.
129. In pilot work, the researchers compared video presentations with written presentations of the
same conditions; there were no statistically significant differences. The investigators decided to present
the benchmark conditions via videos, however, because of the diverse educational and ethnic
backgrounds of the survey participants. The videos were translated into French, Italian, Spanish, and
Portuguese.
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economic losses). The analogue scale ranged from 0 (normal health) to 100
(death). Normal health was defined for participants as “normal health for a
person of your age.”
C. Step 1: Rating Injuries from the ONELS
The Workplace Safety and Insurance Board, the successor agency to the
WCB, provided our team with written transcripts of the voiceover narration
and a dataset containing the participants’ ratings and basic socio-demographic
data on the participants.130 The transcripts, which typically ran three to five
pages in length, were reportedly word-for-word renditions of the narration
contained in the videos.
Eight of the original seventy-eight benchmark conditions were twins: the
same condition was described for a dominant and nondominant limb. Because
there was little discrimination in the ratings among twins, only the ratings for
the dominant limb were included in this analysis. Five other benchmark
conditions had no corresponding data in the ratings dataset, and transcripts for
a further two conditions could not be located. This left transcripts on sixty-three
benchmark conditions.
The types of injury that led to these conditions, the number of ratings each
condition received from ONELS participants, and the mean value of these
ratings are shown in Table 2. The ONELS dataset used in this analysis consisted
of 27,693 ratings of the benchmark conditions from 8,481 participants. On
average, participants rated 3.3 conditions (standard deviation 0.8, range 1–5)
and there were an average of 47.7 ratings per condition (standard deviation
21.8, range 8–1,433).
Table 2: Injuries Rated in Ontario Noneconomic Loss Study

Type of Injury

Number
of
Ratings

Quality-of-Life
Rating
Standard
Mean
Deviation

Head injury (scenario131 A)

24

82.8

7.6

Head injury (scenario C)

41

74.6

17.6

Chronic pain (scenario B)

8

71.9

13.7

Heart attack

89

71.5

19.0

Head injury (scenario B)

73

70.0

15.1

Above-knee amputation

531

68.9

15.7

130. WSIB was unwilling to release the videos because they contained live images of injured
workers who had not consented to this use of the ONELS data.
131. “Scenario” refers to the condition described. Some types of injuries were presented in multiple
scenarios.
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Injury to lower back (scenario C)

150

67.4

16.4

Amputation of arm below elbow (scenario A*) - dominant

1050

66.5

16.2

Amputation of leg below knee (scenario A)

628

65.0

15.8

Injury to lower back (scenario B)

211

64.3

16.3

Asthma (scenario B)

192

64.3

18.8

Amputation of arm below elbow (scenario B) - dominant

744

64.2

16.9

Broken pelvis

502

64.2

16.8

Amputation of hand - dominant

1115

63.2

17.0

Injury to lower back (scenario D)

149

62.4

17.8

9

60.4

14.7

Below-knee amputation (scenario B)

612

57.4

19.2

Amputation of several fingers (scenario A) - dominant
hand
Vibration-induced white finger (scenario B)

565

56.6

17.9

8

56.6

29.0

Dermatitis (scenario B)

167

55.2

20.2

Blindness in one eye

259

54.9

20.9

Several broken fingers (scenario A) - dominant hand

627

54.7

18.9

Asthma (scenario A)

129

54.4

18.2

Amputation of several fingers (scenario B) - dominant hand

506

54.1

18.6

Amputation of several fingers (scenario C) - dominant hand

414

53.6

19.6

Vibration-induced white finger (scenario A)

166

52.9

20.2

Amputation of several fingers (scenario A) - non-dominant
hand
Shoulder injury (scenario C) - dominant side

466

52.7

19.3

410

52.1

18.4

Broken ankle (scenario A)

499

51.2

18.8

Amputation of several fingers (scenario D) - dominant
hand
Several broken fingers (scenario A) - non-dominant hand

371

50.5

18.8

559

50.2

18.9

Chronic pain (scenario A)

Amputation of several fingers (scenario B) - non-dominant
hand
Hearing loss (scenario B - higher)

552

49.4

19.6

225

47.8

22.3

Injury to knee cap

229

47.4

17.6

Shoulder injury (scenario A) - dominant side

1299

47.3

17.8

Broken elbow - dominant arm

329

46.9

18.7

Amputation of several fingers (scenario C) - non-dominant
hand

398

46.6

18.6
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Shoulder injury (scenario A) - non-dominant side

626

46.5

18.9

Broken bones in lower leg

472

46.2

19.3

Broken hip

492

45.9

18.8

Injury to knee joint

275

44.9

18.5

Amputation of several fingers (scenario D) - non-dominant
hand
Hearing loss (scenario A - mild)

307

44.7

18.2

158

44.2

21.7

Injury to knee ligaments

401

43.8

18.0

Injury to wrist (scenario B) - dominant hand

377

43.2

20.0

Injury to wrist (scenario A) - dominant hand

326

42.5

18.8

Shoulder injury (scenario D) - dominant side

256

41.1

18.8

Broken ankle (scenario B)

280

41.0

19.8

Broken wrist (scenario A) - dominant hand

247

40.8

20.3

Broken heel bone

297

40.3

16.9

Shoulder injury (scenario D) - non-dominant side

257

40.2

19.9

Shoulder injury (scenario B) - dominant side

886

39.9

18.0

Elbow injury - dominant arm

951

39.8

19.0

Dermatitis (scenario A)

113

38.6

18.6

Several broken fingers (scenario B) - dominant hand

384

37.9

19.5

Shoulder injury (scenario B) - non-dominant side

1126

37.8

18.6

Amputation of thumb - dominant hand

1433

37.3

18.8

Amputation of thumb - non-dominant hand

1305

35.2

19.3

Broken wrist (scenario B) - dominant hand

301

35.1

19.6

Amputation of part of finger (scenario A) - dominant hand

378

31.7

18.5

Amputation of part of finger (scenario B) - dominant hand

279

28.4

17.9

Single broken finger - non-dominant hand

503

22.7

17.1

Single broken finger - dominant hand

957

22.3

15.8

27,693

47.7

21.8

All injuries

The analysis of the ONELS data began with reviews of the sixty-three
transcripts using an instrument developed specifically for this exercise. Two
reviewers did this work: one reviewer was a study investigator trained in
internal medicine and the other was a layperson. The reviews were guided by a
detailed training manual and a structured assessment form.
The instrument directed reviewers to specify the part(s) of the body and
general functions affected by the condition based on the information provided
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in the transcript, and then to rate a series of dimensions likely to influence
quality of life. Specifically, they rated pain (on an eleven-point scale ranging
from “no pain” to “worst pain possible”),132 ability to perform ten activities of
daily living (on the standard five-point activities-of-daily-living (ADL) scale
ranging from “unable to perform task” to “fully independent”),133 impact on
emotional or psychological well-being and impact on ability to enjoy social or
leisure activities (both on ten-point scales ranging from “no impact” to
“devastating impact”). Reviewers scored dimensions with reference to the
chronic stage of permanent impairment, not the acute phase immediately
following the injury.
The degree of concordance across reviewer judgments was examined by a
third investigator not involved in the reviews. Discrepant reviewer judgments
about subjective items such as pain level were allowed to stand, while
discordant judgments about objective items such as body part affected were
resolved by the third investigator, who reviewed the responses in light of the
transcript and broke the tie. For some discrepancies, decision rules were also
applied—for example, a rule that injuries to an arm or hand would be coded as
hand only or arm only unless the transcript explicitly mentioned that both arm
and hand were affected. The data was manually coded, entered into an Excel
spreadsheet, double-checked for accuracy, and then converted to a Stata file for
analysis.
D. Step 2: Linking Data from the ONELS and the Transcript Review
The next step was to use multivariable regression analysis to examine the
relationship between the reviewers’ assessments of the various quality-of-life
dimensions and the overall rating ONELS participants had made on the visual
analog scale. After constructing thirty-eight explanatory variables based on
information gathered in the transcript reviews, we ran ordinary least-squares
regressions at the rating level. In constructing indicator variables for body parts
affected, we used the final determination made by the third reviewer. For the
ratings of pain, activity limitations, and impact on emotional well-being and
social or leisure activities, we used a mean of the values assigned by the two
transcript reviewers.
In preliminary regressions, some indicator variables for detailed body parts
had to be dropped due to collinearity; in these situations, the higher-level body
part (for example, the hand rather than the finger) was retained in the model.
The variables indicating limitations in activities of daily living were examined

132. For pain ratings, the instrument incorporated the NRS-11, a validated and widely used scale in
clinical medicine. See generally Amelia Williamson & Barbara Hoggart, Pain: A Review of Three
Commonly Used Pain Rating Scales, 14 J. CLINICAL NURSING 798 (2005).
133. For ratings of the ability to perform activities of daily living, the instrument incorporated the
modified Barthel Index, a validated scale proposed by Shah and colleagues. See generally Surya Shah et
al., Improving the Sensitivity of the Barthel Index for Stroke Rehabilitation, 42 J. CLINICAL
EPIDEMIOLOGY 703 (1989).
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both separately and as a single overall summary variable constructed as the sum
of the activity-specific scores. However, none of the specifications of this
variable tried in univariate analyses approached statistical significance in its
correlations with the ONELS quality-of-life ratings (the p-values were all
greater than 0.8), so we omitted activities-of-daily-living variables from further
consideration.
Table 3 contains the final set of predictors and results from the multivariable
regression analysis. The upper half of the table shows coefficients on indicator
variables for body parts; the lower half of the table reports on coefficients
related to problems in each of the quality-of-life dimensions coded by the
reviewers (pain, sensory decrements, and so on). In interpreting the regression
coefficients, it is helpful to remember that the higher the rating on the outcome
variable, the worse the participant deemed the injury’s effect on quality of life
to be.
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Table 3: Multivariable Predictors of Ontario Workers’ Ratings of Lost
Quality of Life in Sixty-Three Benchmark Conditions (n=27,693)
Dimension

Coefficient

95% Confidence
Interval

p Value

Body part affected:
Brain

1.78

-2.91

6.46

0.46

Face

-12.22

-16.64

-8.21

<0.001

Eyes

7.00

3.19

10.81

<0.001

Other head

-15.67

-23.12

-8.21

<0.001

Central nervous system

-4.28

-7.81

-0.74

0.02

Internal organs

0.22

-3.28

3.72

0.90

One arm

4.78

4.02

5.54

<0.001

Both arms

-12.60

-17.87

-7.33

<0.001

One hand

-2.88

-4.34

-1.42

<0.001

Both hands

15.12

11.73

18.50

<0.001

Leg

-3.82

-6.19

-1.46

0.001

One foot

-11.05

-12.30

-9.80

<0.001

Both feet

-0.27

-11.48

10.94

0.96

Back/spine

-12.73

-16.05

-9.41

<0.001

3.74

2.60

4.88

<0.001

3.82

3.41

4.24

<0.001

Fine motor function

-5.41

-6.63

-4.19

<0.001

Gross motor function

9.28

6.40

12.17

<0.001

Lifting

2.74

1.69

3.78

<0.001

Emotional well-being

8.23

7.60

8.86

<0.001

Sexual function

3.09

1.83

4.36

<0.001

Effect on leisure activities

3.41

2.91

3.91

<0.001

Constant

15.46

14.25

16.67

<0.001

Other sensory organs
134

Pain

Effects on:

135

Nearly all variables are statistically significant predictors of ONELS ratings
(that is, the p-values were less than 0.05). Although we expected all of the
dimensions’ coefficients to be positive because more severe effects of an injury
should produce worse overall quality-of-life valuations (all other things being
134. Measured on a 10-point scale ranging from “no pain” (1) to “worst possible pain” (10).
Coefficient refers to a 1-unit increase on the scale.
135. Measured on a 10-point scale ranging from “no impact” (1) to “devastating impact” (10).
Coefficient refers to a 1-unit increase on the scale.
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equal), it is noteworthy that some are not. Specifically, the coefficients on
injuries to several body areas (face, other head, both arms, one foot, and the
spine) are negative and nontrivial in size. Given the relatively limited set of
conditions examined in this exercise, it is difficult to ascribe these paradoxical
negative effects to a specific cause, but there are at least two probable
explanations. First, because the range of levels on the various dimensions across
the sixty-three vignettes was relatively limited, some collinearity remains across
dimensions. The coefficients are interpreted as effects that are conditional on
the other dimensions held at fixed levels, but correlation across dimensions
complicates interpretation of these marginal effects. Second, the small number
of vignettes demanded parsimony in the descriptive system, so it is likely that
other omitted quality-of-life dimensions influenced responses in ways that
confound estimation of effects for variables included in the model.
Because the purpose of the present exercise was to demonstrate proof of
concept, the finding of paradoxical results points to important design
considerations that should be taken into account in future efforts to develop
health-utilities approaches to valuing noneconomic loss. These include design of
a standardized descriptive system in which dimensions are largely orthogonal,
and careful selection of conditions to maximize independent variation across
dimensions.
E. Step 3: Applying the Weights to Create Noneconomic Loss Scores for
Malpractice Injuries
The coefficients derived in the multivariable analysis can be interpreted as
weights. The variables represent dimensions of permanent health conditions,
and the weights quantify the independent contributions of those dimensions to
overall valuations of the condition’s impact on quality of life. In theory, then,
the weights should be transferable to other conditions. We tested this
hypothesis by applying the weights to a small sample of permanent conditions
arising from injuries sustained due to medical malpractice.
This data on medical injuries came from a study conducted at Harvard
University between 2001 and 2005, the Malpractice Insurers Medical Error
Prevention Study (MIMEPS). The data sources and methods of MIMEPS have
been described in detail elsewhere.136 Briefly, five malpractice-insurance
companies based in four regions of the United States participated in the study,
contributing data on 1,452 closed claims from four key clinical areas: obstetrics,

136. See generally Tejal K. Gandhi et al., Missed and Delayed Diagnoses in the Ambulatory Setting:
A Study of Closed Malpractice Claims, 145 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 488 (2006); Selwyn O. Rogers et
al., Analysis of Surgical Errors in Closed Malpractice Claims at 4 Liability Insurers, 140 SURGERY 25
(2006); David M. Studdert et al., Claims, Errors, and Compensation Payments in Medical Malpractice
Litigation, 354 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2024 (2006).

STUDDERT, KACHALIA, SALOMON, & MELLO

92

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

4/30/2011

[Vol. 74:57

surgery, missed or delayed diagnoses, and medication-related injuries.137 Trained
physician–reviewers who were specialists in each of these clinical areas
reviewed the claim files. Their reviews included judgments about whether the
claim involved an identifiable injury due to medical care, the severity of the
injury,138 and whether the injury was due to medical error.139
The current analysis focuses on sixteen injuries selected from among the 889
cases in the MIMEPS sample that had been judged to involve injury due to
error. The injuries were selected by reference to three considerations: severity,
clinical area, and prevalence among medical-malpractice claims. With respect to
severity, MIMEPS reviewers had rated all injuries on the NAIC scale, which
includes five categories of permanent injury (minor, significant, major, grave,
and death). After excluding death cases, we sampled injuries from each of the
other four categories. With respect to clinical area, we used the four areas that
formed the basis of the MIMEPS sampling strategy.140 The combination of these
strata meant sixteen groups of MIMEPS injuries (four severity levels times four
clinical areas) from which to sample. Although an attempt was made to select
an injury from each group, one group (obstetrics, grave) was ultimately dropped
because it proved qualitatively impossible to distinguish it from another
(obstetrics, major) based on the information available in the MIMEPS dataset.
Finally, two investigators, who have together reviewed more than 7,000
medical-malpractice files, decided which injury to choose from among the many
within each group. The decision was not random, but based on a judgment
about types of harms often seen in malpractice litigation.
Records from the original MIMEPS review captured free-text descriptions
of the fifteen injuries chosen, including chronic physical limitations associated
with each. For purposes of the current study, the two investigators reviewed
these descriptions and scored the injuries using the same instrument used in the
earlier review of ONELS transcripts. Once again, the focus of the review was on
the chronic condition that stemmed from the permanent injury, not the injury’s
acute phase.141 The reviews were conducted independently and then compared.
Discrepancies were discussed to reach consensus.
Health-Utility-Based Noneconomic Loss (HUBNEL) scores for each of the
fifteen conditions were calculated by combining the coefficients in the
137. Alleged injuries in these categories dominate the caseload of malpractice insurers in the United
States, accounting for approximately eighty percent of all claims and an even larger proportion of total
indemnity costs. Studdert et al, supra note 136, at 2025.
138. The reviewers scored injury severity using the nine-point NAIC scale, NAT’L ASS’N OF INS.
COMM’RS, supra note 62.
139. The reviewers applied the Institute of Medicine’s definition of error: “the failure of a planned
action to be completed as intended [that is, error of execution] or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an
aim [that is, error of planning].” INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH
SYSTEM 28 (Janet M. Corrigan & Molla S. Donaldson eds., 2000).
140. See supra note 137 and accompanying text.
141. Given the average length of time between the injury date and the filing of a malpractice claim
(two years), see Studdert et al., supra note 136, at 2027, nearly all injuries in the sample had entered a
chronic phase.
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regression analysis of ONELS data (that is, the findings from step 2) with the
scores on those same quality-of-life dimensions obtained in the review of the
selected MIMEPS cases. Specifically, the HUBNEL scores were calculated by
multiplying each dimension’s score by its corresponding coefficient, or weight,
and then summing these values within each condition.
Table 4 shows the resulting HUBNEL scores for the fifteen medicalmalpractice injuries. Like the original ratings in the ONELS, the HUBNEL
scores fall on a scale from 0 to 100, with higher scores indicating worse quality
of life.
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Table 4: Health-Utility-Based Noneconomic Loss (HUBNEL) Scores
Estimated for Medical-Malpractice Injuries

Obstetrics

Medication

Diagnosis

Operative

Clinical
Area

NAIC
Severity
Score

Noneconomic
Loss Score

Description of Injury

6

41.2

Nerve injury due to improper arm positioning during general
anesthesia for hip surgery. The injury resulted in weakness of the
right shoulder and paresthesia of the medial upper arm

7

45.5

Intracerebral hemorrhage during an ultrasound-guided biopsy
that was not medically indicated. The hemorrhage required
craniotomy and resulted in long-term neurologic problems
including aphasia, seizures, bedwetting, depression, and
difficulties performing activities of daily living

8

59.8

Blindness in right eye resulting from poor post-operative followup after cataract surgery

9

62.4

Quadriplegia from an error during a cervical spine discectomy
and fusion

6

54.9

Physical disfigurement resulting from missed diagnosis of a
ruptured pectoralis muscle that could not later be repaired;
injury ended the patient’s career as a bodybuilder

7

34.6

Permanent adrenal insufficiency caused by missed adrenal
hemorrhage after knee-replacement surgery

8

64.5

Myocardial infarction and heart failure caused by failure to
properly evaluate chest pain

9

73.8

Metastatic breast cancer resulting from a seventeen-month delay
in diagnostic tests for the evaluation of a new breast lump

6

29.3

Tissue necrosis of forearm resulting from improper infusion of
hydrochloric acid and requiring a skin graft

7

42.5

Bladder dysfunction, foot drop, gait instability, and mild
cognitive impairment resulting from an epidural hematoma due
to the patient being put on anticoagulation too soon after back
surgery and not being appropriately monitored

8

71.8

Stroke and hemiparesis after patient received wrong dose of
anticoagulants following cardiac surgery

9

77.5

Permanent mental retardation and blindness in infant resulting
from cardiac arrest due to inadequate monitoring after herniarepair surgery and probable overdose of potassium

6

34.0

Temporary (six-month) colostomy with permanent
gastrointestinal side effects caused by erroneous stitching of the
colon to the abdominal wall

7

43.1

Shoulder dystocia resulting in brachial plexus injury to neonate
caused by a failure to perform cesarean section

8

83.0

Cerebral palsy with mild retardation and inability to walk
without braces due to failure to diagnose fetal distress during
delivery

STUDDERT, KACHALIA, SALOMON, & MELLO

Summer 2011]

4/30/2011

RATIONALIZING NONECONOMIC DAMAGES

95

Several aspects of these results are noteworthy. First, the HUBNEL scores
are high—with some exceeding those of any of the ONELS benchmark
conditions—attesting to the gravity of some of the malpractice injuries. Second,
the NAIC physical-severity measure and the noneconomic loss scores are
correlated, with the HUBNEL score increasing monotonically with the NAIC
score in the expected direction.142 For injuries with an NAIC rating of 6, the
average across the four clinical areas was 39.9; for ratings of 7, it was 41.4; for
ratings of 8, it was 65.8; and for ratings of 9, it was 71.2.
Arranging the HUBNEL scores by NAIC levels shows this correlation more
clearly (Figure 1). What it also shows, however, is that there is substantial
variation in HUBNEL scores both within and across NAIC levels. In other
words, although physical severity and noneconomic loss roughly track one
another, the correlation is imperfect. This finding joins others in highlighting
the problem of using metrics designed primarily to assess levels of physical
injury for determining levels of noneconomic loss.143
Figure 1: HUBNEL Scores for a Sample of Medical-Malpractice Injuries,
By Clinical Category and NAIC Severity Score
90
obstetrics
diagnosis

80

Noneconomic loss score

medication
medication

70
diagnosis
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operative
diagnosis
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operative

obstetrics

operative

obstetrics

medication
diagnosis

30
medication

20
10
0

NAIC level 6

NAIC level 7

NAIC level 8

NAIC level 9

Physical severity score
142. There is one exception. The diagnostic injury with an NAIC score of 6 had a much higher
HUBNEL score than the diagnostic injury with an NAIC score of 7. That an injury involving
disfigurement should be an outlier in correlations with a physical severity metric is not surprising. See
supra note 67 and accompanying text.
143. An alternative explanation is that the within-level variation is attributable to measurement- or
model-specification error. This is unlikely to explain all of the variation, but it probably contributes to
some of it.
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This empirical analysis has demonstrated the feasibility of generating
health-utility-based noneconomic loss scores for medical-malpractice injuries.
Although this exercise was limited in scope, it shows proof of concept, and
could be extended to tier a much larger sample of injuries. Part VI describes
some of the practical issues likely to arise in any such expanded effort, paying
special attention to the medical-malpractice context.
VI
OPERATIONALIZING A HEALTH-UTILITIES SCHEDULE
A. Creating a Full Set of HUBNEL Scores
This article has illustrated a general method of producing health-utilities
scores to value the noneconomic loss associated with different types of
malpractice injuries. The method of review and calculation described in step 3
could easily be repeated for other types of harms arising in personal-injury
litigation to produce a larger set of HUBNEL scores.
Practical imperatives steered this analysis toward the ONELS dataset: It
proved impossible to locate any other existing ratings of the perceived severity
of a large number of injuries. However, the study’s use of utility measures
derived from a limited assessment of workplace injuries was less than ideal; it
necessitated a rather circuitous process and may not have produced a scoring
function that appropriately captures all relevant dimensions of malpractice
injuries. A more efficient method would be to obtain the utility weights of
interest directly, through laypersons’ quality-of-life assessments of a set of
specific injuries prevalent in tort claims.
However, rather than obtaining global valuations of these injuries (as was
done in the ONELS), the preferred approach in contemporary health-utilities
research is to disaggregate the health states into constituent dimensions and
then elicit ratings on each (as this article did in adapting ONELS ratings for use
in the medical-malpractice setting). This produces a more versatile set of
weights, capable of ready application to a wide range of injuries and tort
settings. The weights become a modular vehicle for calculating HUBNEL-like
scores to guide calculations of noneconomic damages. They may be applied in
jury rooms, alternative dispute resolution forums, or backroom settlement
negotiations—wherever uncertainty over levels of damages arises.
Establishment of tiers based only on the raw HUBNEL scores would be the
simplest basis for tiering injuries in a noneconomic-damages schedule. A more
sophisticated schedule would adjust the scores according to certain other case
characteristics—for example, the duration of quality-of-life effects and age.144
There is a strong argument, in the case of nonpermanent injuries, for ensuring

144. This discussion is adapted from the TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 54–56.
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the schedule takes into account the time spent in the health state. The rationale
is that compensation for noneconomic loss should reflect the length of time
over which the plaintiff had to endure the suffering.145 This is not a novel
suggestion; courts in most jurisdictions already permit jurors to calculate
noneconomic damages using a per diem method—that is, by determining the
noneconomic damages for a particular unit of time, such as one day, and
multiplying this amount by the number of days that the plaintiff’s injury is
expected to last.146 Moreover, QALYs and DALYs, the most widely used
summary measures of health in priority-setting research, were designed
specifically to incorporate this time factor for nonfatal health outcomes.147
The argument for incorporating information about the plaintiff’s age,
independent of considerations about duration of injury, is less compelling.
Several surveys have shown public preferences for allocating lifesaving
treatment to young adults over older adults and young children.148 Such
preferences may have implications for how the public values noneconomic loss
at different points in the lifecycle. This is a value judgment that would need to
be made through a deliberative process, rather than through expert
decisionmaking.
Adding consideration of case characteristics other than the HUBNEL score
will complicate the damages schedule. Tiers would acquire subtiers, and
considerations of time will introduce a multiplier that must be algebraically
integrated with the HUBNEL score.149 Grafting additional characteristics into
the HUBNEL formula is not technically difficult, but it adds to the complexity,
and potentially also to implementability.
B. Assigning Dollar Values
As discussed earlier, the health-utilities approach to scheduling provides a
basis only for tiering injuries, not for assigning dollar values to each tier. This
145. See Avraham, supra note 41, at 95 (“The total pain and suffering of a sixty-year-old who is
assumed to suffer twenty more years of pain and suffering is different than that of a twenty-year-old
who would suffer sixty more years.”).
146. Joseph H. King, Jr., Counting Angels and Weighing Anchors: Per Diem Arguments for
Noneconomic Personal Injury Tort Damages, 71 TENN. L. REV. 1, 13–16 (2003) (describing a split
among courts as to the permissibility of per diem arguments but noting that a majority of jurisdictions
allow such arguments); TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 23 (citing Geistfeld, supra note 1, at
782).
147. See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
148. See generally Magnus Johanneson & Per-Olov Johannson, Is the Valuation of a QALY Gained
Independent of Age?, 16 J. HEALTH ECON. 589 (1997); P.A. Lewis & M. Charney, Which of Two
Individuals Do You Treat When Only Their Ages Are Different and You Can’t Treat Both?, 15 J. MED.
ETHICS. 28 (1989). The DALY also makes an adjustment of this kind. See Murray, supra note 91, at 54–
61.
149. Both QALYs and DALYs treat severity and duration as independent, which means that the
number of QALYs or DALYs associated with a period of time spent in a particular health state is
computed by multiplying the utility weight for that state by the duration. Time preference—that is,
discounting of consequences that occur in the future—complicates the computation somewhat, but the
general approach remains multiplicative.
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second step in creating a schedule of noneconomic damages for malpractice
cases would require a separate process. One possible option is to use the
precedential approach. A large sample of closed claims could be studied to
identify injuries that have HUBNEL scores in each of the tiers established in
the damages schedule. Data on settlements and jury awards in these cases could
then identify a range of dollar values for each tier (or a single dollar amount,
such as the mean or median award in past cases). Another option would be to
use outputs from contingent-valuation studies to monetize QALYs. Perhaps the
most palatable option from a political standpoint would be to convene a
deliberative body to assign dollar values to tiers or QALYs based on the
members’ independent judgments of what constitutes fair compensation for
noneconomic loss. Any such body should include representation from all
relevant stakeholder groups in order to maximize the likelihood that its
decisions are perceived by the public as fair, reasonable, and legitimate.
C. Application to Wrongful Death Cases150
The proposals outlined so far contemplate the typical personal-injury case in
which the plaintiff sues seeking damages for his own injury. Wrongful death
cases brought by the injured person’s family present special challenges for
quantifying noneconomic damages, especially where the patient died
instantaneously and personally experienced no pain and suffering. In such
cases, the relevant noneconomic injury is the emotional anguish and loss of
companionship suffered by the family of the decedent.
The scheduling approach described above could be applied to wrongful
death claims. Ratings of how the death of a family member affects survivors
would have to be obtained through a separate process, but could follow
essentially the same basic steps as outlined above for deriving HUBNEL scores.
Alternatively, policymakers could opt to carve wrongful death cases out from
the damages schedule and allow decisionmakers to determine noneconomic
awards in such cases on an ad hoc basis.151
D. Use of the Schedule by Juries and Other Decisionmakers152
Those charged with determining noneconomic damages could use a
damages schedule in at least three different ways. First, decisionmakers could
be required to select an amount for noneconomic damages that matches the
amount or falls within the range specified for the relevant injury or tier.153 The
advantages of a mandatory schedule are uniformity of awards for similar
injuries (horizontal equity), proportionality of awards according to injury
150. This discussion is adapted from the TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 59–60.
151. Cf. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 100, at 584–85 (arguing that valuations of a lost life should be
made on a case-by-case basis, as a uniform value would ignore important variations in value across both
risks and persons).
152. This discussion is adapted from the TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 56–57, 62.
153. See, e.g., Bovbjerg et al., supra note 8, at 946 (advocating the mandatory approach).
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severity (vertical equity), predictability of awards for parties to litigation and
liability insurers, and strong potential for cost control. The primary drawback is
that the decisionmaker has little or no ability to adjust awards for exceptional
cases.154 In the case of juries, there may also be state law barriers to imposing a
binding schedule—for example, it may be deemed to abridge the right to jury
trial protected by the state’s constitution.
A second approach would be to make the schedule purely discretionary or
advisory in nature. It could be provided to decisionmakers on the assumption
that they are free to use or disregard it as they choose. The advantages and
disadvantages of this alternative are the reverse of the above: It allows
decisionmakers wide latitude to ensure their awards reflect absolute fairness
and would involve fewer legal and political complexities; however, the goals of
horizontal and vertical equity, predictability, and cost control may be only
weakly served, depending on how frequently decisionmakers chose to depart
from the schedules.
A middle-ground approach would be to use a presumptive schedule. The
amounts specified in the schedule would be presumptively applied unless
particular circumstances in a case created a strong justification for an upward or
downward departure. Litigants might be required to justify a departure, or
decisionmakers might be required to award an amount within the prescribed
range (or close to the prescribed amount) unless they made a specific finding
that an upward or downward departure was justified.
Where the primacy of individualized decisionmaking about noneconomic
damages is valued either for political or for constitutional reasons, a relatively
nonbinding schedule is preferable. Decisions about when and how the schedule
is deployed are best made by local legal experts, following review of relevant
constitutional precedents concerning due process and jury trial rights and
consideration of feasible jury instructions for courts of the relevant jurisdiction.
E. Updating the Schedule155
Damages schedules require maintenance. Regular review and updating of
the dollar values is critical in order to ensure the schedule continues to reflect
contemporary social judgments about the value of noneconomic losses.
Updating the dollar values could consist of a simple annual adjustment for
inflation.156 Alternatively, if the initial dollar amounts were set using the

154. Bovbjerg and colleagues have suggested that a post-trial process could be created in which
plaintiffs would have the opportunity to argue that their case should be considered atypical and given a
supplementary damages award. They suggest the process could be administrative in nature, not
requiring the plaintiff to pursue a full judicial appeal. Id. at 948.
155. This discussion is adapted from the TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 1, at 59.
156. Bovbjerg et al., supra note 8, at 963.
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precedential approach, the update might require a fresh analysis of settlement
and award levels in recent cases.157
It may also be advisable to periodically revisit the structure of the tiers.
Clinical experts should be consulted to determine whether advancements in
treatment and rehabilitation have materially changed the pain, suffering, and
quality-of-life losses associated with the various injuries specified in the tiers.
Some conditions may require reclassification to a lower tier.
VII
CONCLUSION
Juries, courts, lawyers, accident insurers, and legal scholars continue to
struggle with how to assess noneconomic loss and decide noneconomic damages
in personal-injury litigation. The lack of clear guidance on how to “quantify the
unquantifiable” has allowed inconsistency and unpredictability to flourish in
this component of damages assessments, with adverse impacts for the fairness,
efficiency, cost, and perceived legitimacy of the civil justice system. One noted
commentator recently coined noneconomic damages “the irrational centerpiece
of our tort system.”158
Caps on noneconomic damages are a procrustean solution to the problem.
They tackle the perceived excesses of runaway liability costs, but skirt the
fundamental policy questions: What is the right level of noneconomic damages
for particular harms, and how should that be determined? Caps preserve some
inequities and worsen others, and if they ameliorate inequities at all, they do so
accidentally.
This article presents an alternative to flat caps. Methodologies used to grade
health states, developed over decades to aid health program evaluations and
difficult resource-allocation decisions, could be gainfully trained on the problem
of how to evaluate noneconomic losses. Using a health-utilities index as the
basis of a schedule of noneconomic damages for medical-malpractice injuries is
an attractive idea. The approach embeds subjective valuations in a standardized
empirical framework, respects concepts of vertical and horizontal equity, and
promises to reduce variability and boost predictability in noneconomic awards.
What it does not do is provide dollar valuations for the tiers it creates. That is a
normative task best addressed through a separate process.
This article also demonstrated the feasibility of creating such a healthutilities-based schedule. As a technical matter, the task is relatively
straightforward—indeed, starting with a set of ratings derived from valuations
157. Not discussed here is the practical complication that, in any updating exercise referencing
precedent, the data would be “tarnished” if the damages valuations examined were themselves the
result of application of the schedule. One possible way around this problem would be to draw the data
from other jurisdictions that do not use a damages schedule and that are thought to have similar social
values to the jurisdiction updating its schedule.
158. Paul V. Niemeyer, Awards for Pain and Suffering: The Irrational Centerpiece of Our Tort
System, 90 VA. L. REV. 1401, 1401 (2004).
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of tort-related harms, a luxury not available for the empirical analysis reported
in this article, would have made the process much simpler. Nonetheless, even
with a scientifically sound schedule in hand, several important practical
questions remain. To what extent should the schedule extend beyond healthstate valuations and include consideration of other case-level characteristics in
setting weights or scores? How strictly should decisionmakers apply the
schedule? And what process should be used to assign dollar values or
multipliers? Uncertainty also remains about the willingness of judges and juries,
decisionmakers in alternative dispute resolution settings, and litigants to accept
a noneconomic-damages schedule.159
These are precisely the kinds of issues that careful state-based
experimentation with a health-utilities-based noneconomic-damages schedule
could iron out. At a time when the federal government’s interest in testing
innovations in the medical-liability system is running high,160 the noneconomicdamages schedule, preferably one based on a health-utilities approach, is an
idea that begs serious consideration.

159. For an indication of the spirited defense of jury discretion and unfettered case-by-case
decisionmaking a schedule like this would be likely to encounter, see Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., The
Tragedy in Torts, 5 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 139, 172 (1996). See also Sanders, supra note 47, at
507–14.
160. See Press Release, Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, U.S. Dep’t of Health &
Human Servs., HHS Announces Patient Safety and Medical Liability Demonstration Projects (June 11,
2010), available at http://www.ahrq.gov/news/press/pr2010/hhsliabawpr.htm.

